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Article 
Cooperative Tax Regulation 
DENNIS J. VENTRY, JR. 
This Article describes a new approach to tax regulation based on 
cooperation, information sharing, and interest convergence.  Currently, 
tax regulation in the United States relies too heavily on sticks and not 
enough on carrots.  While recognizing that taxpayers will comply with the 
law in the presence of effective deterrence and enforcement, this Article 
optimizes the use of penalties as a compliance instrument by, among other 
things, rewarding compliant taxpayers, engaging taxpayers and their 
advisors in a participatory process, and appreciating the elegant power of 
cognitive devices that portray payment of taxes as a bonus rather than 
nonpayment of taxes as a penalty.  Even with optimal penalties, tax 
officials cannot currently enforce the law effectively due to severe resource 
and information asymmetries.  To overcome these debilitating 
shortcomings, the government must improve funding, recruiting, training, 
and retention.  It must also partner with taxpayers and practitioners to 
strengthen detection, enforcement, and prosecution of abusive tax 
avoidance.  Cooperative tax regulation can accomplish a cultural shift not 
only in taxpaying but also in tax advising and tax administration.  
Ultimately, it can produce a regulatory environment of collaboration 
rather than adversity, ex ante resolution rather than ex post controversy, 
and certainty rather than secrecy. 
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Cooperative Tax Regulation 
DENNIS J. VENTRY, JR.∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In February 2006, the Internal Revenue Service announced that it 
failed to collect as much as $353 billion in taxes owed for tax year 2001.1  
The “tax gap,” the difference between what taxpayers should pay and what 
they pay on a timely basis, reflected a compliance rate of 83.7%.2  
Congress reacted strongly.  Senator Max Baucus (D-MT) called the tax 
avoidance unpatriotic and responsible for the federal deficit.  “When 
people and companies . . . don’t pay their taxes, the burden for paying this 
country’s expenses falls even more heavily on Americans who do their 
duty every April 15.”3  It was the government’s obligation “to go after 
scofflaws and tax cheats big and small, who are contributing to the deficit 
by not contributing their fair share.”4  Baucus and others urged the Bush 
administration to move aggressively,5 and to rework preliminary proposals 
which were forecast to net $3.5 billion over ten years, just one-tenth of one 
                                                                                                                          
∗ Acting Professor of Law, UC Davis School of Law.  I thank Ellen Aprill, Jonathan Baker, 
Steven Bank, Joseph Bankman, Mortimer Caplin, Susan Carle, Michelle Kane, Leandra Lederman, 
Edward McCaffery, Andrew Pike, Deborah Schenk, William Simon, Jay Soled, and Kirk Stark.  I also 
thank a number of individuals in private law practice, none of whom disclosed client confidences nor 
discussed specific transactions, as well as several government tax officials, none of whom disclosed 
taxpayer information.  In addition, I benefited from comments received at the Advanced Topics in 
Taxation Colloquium at Northwestern School of Law, the Critical Tax Theory Conference at UCLA 
School of Law, the Junior Tax Scholars Workshop at Boston University School of Law, and the 
Washington College of Law Junior Faculty Workshop. 
1 IRS News Release IR-2006-28 (Feb. 14, 2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/ 
article/0,,id=154496,00.html. 
2 Press Release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Testimony of Treasury Assistant Secretary for 
Tax Policy Eric Solomon Before the Senate Finance Committee on Ways to Reduce the Tax Gap (Apr. 
18, 2007), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp360.htm. 
3 Press Release, Sen. Max Baucus, Baucus Calls New Tax Gap Numbers “Unacceptable,” Calls 
for Bolder IRS Action to Collect Taxes Owed (2006) [hereinafter Baucus Press Release], available at 
http://finance.senate.gov/press/Bpress/2005press/prb021406a.pdf; see also GSA Contractors Who 
Cheat on Their Taxes and What Should Be Done About It: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. 
on Investigation, 109th Cong. 2 (2006) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin, D-MI) (“[W]hen so many 
Americans fail to pay the taxes that they owe, it begins to undermine the fairness of our tax system, 
forcing honest taxpayers to make up the shortfall needed to pay for basic federal protections.”).  
4 Baucus Press Release, supra note 3.   
5 See, e.g., Memorandum, Sen. Charles Grassley, Tax Gap Numbers (Feb. 14, 2006), available at 
http://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2005/prg02106b.pdf; Stephen Joyce, Everson Urges Fiscal 2008 
Request Approval; Conrad Calls Tax Gap Proposals ‘Too Modest’, 31 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-1 
(Feb. 15, 2007) (quoting Sen. Kent Conrad, D-ND, demanding a “far more aggressive approach” to 
close the tax gap).  
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percent of the estimated $3.5 trillion tax gap.6  
A slew of recommendations sprung forth.  The Bush administration 
offered sixteen new legislative proposals7 to implement the Treasury 
Department’s “comprehensive, integrated, multi-year strategy” to close the 
tax gap.8  At the same time, legislators introduced more than a dozen tax 
gap bills.9  Closing the gap became a priority for the IRS10 and a bipartisan 
issue for Congress.11  The revenue to be gained from closing the tax gap 
was “low-hanging fruit,” according to Charles Rangel (D-NY).12  It could 
eliminate the deficit,13 pay for revising the Alternative Minimum Tax,14 
and reform the health care system.15  
Meanwhile, a minority warned against viewing the tax gap as a 
policymaking panacea.  Charles Grassley (R-IA) noted that politicians had 
already begun to see the tax gap as “one of those magic elixirs” for all 
fiscal problems, so much so that he expressed feigned surprise that “folks 
don’t think the tax gap can cure baldness.”16  The Treasury Department had 
estimated that 54% of the gap involved noncompliance where there was 
little or no third-party reporting of a taxpayer’s liability.17  Noncompliance 
for rents and royalties, for instance, equaled 51%, for non-farm proprietor 
                                                                                                                          
6 The Tax Gap and How to Solve It: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Budget, 109th Cong. 
(2006) (written testimony of Mark W. Everson, IRS Commissioner). 
7 See Department of the Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2008 
Revenue Proposals, at 63–82 (2007) [hereinafter Dep’t of the Treasury, General Explanations], 
available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/bluebk07.pdf.  
8 IRS, Reducing the Federal Tax Gap: A Report on Improving Voluntary Compliance, at 3 (2007) 
[hereinafter Reducing the Federal Tax Gap], available at http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/0,,id= 
172790,00.html. 
9 A list of the bills is on file with the Author.  
10 See IRS Oversight Board Annual Report, at 4, 19 (2006) (identifying the tax gap as a primary 
concern for tax year 2007). 
11 See, e.g., Kurt Ritterpusch, Rangel Says Forging Bipartisan Alliances Will Be Priority Over 
AMT, Tax Gap Issues, 224 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-6 (Nov. 21, 2006) (describing consensus to 
close the gap).  
12 Kurt Ritterpusch, Post-Election Action on Closing Tax Gap Deemed Common Ground Issue for 
Congress, 208 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-1 (Oct. 27, 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
13 See e.g., Letter from Sens. Evan Bayh, Ron Wyden, Charles E. Schumer, Barack Obama, to  
IRS Commissioner Mark W. Everson, (Jan. 19, 2007), available at 7 TAXCORE (BNA) 15 (Jan. 24, 
2007) (explaining that closing the tax gap could “eliminate the unified budget deficit”); Drew Douglas, 
Treasury 2008 Budget Plan to Include Renewed Focus on Compliance, Tax Gap, 13 DAILY TAX REP. 
(BNA), at G-2 (Jan. 22, 2007) (discussing tax gap proposals to reduce the deficit).  
14 Ritterpusch, supra note 12 (discussing how Rangel viewed the tax gap as a way to pay for 
AMT reform). 
15 119 CONG. REC. S3058 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 2007) (statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley, R-IA) 
(noting that many members of Congress perceive the tax gap as a “cure all,” and as a way to expand 
spending on health care). 
16 Id.; see also Examining the Administration’s Plan for Reducing the Tax Gap: What Are the 
Goals, Benchmarks, and Timetables?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 110th Cong. (Apr. 18, 
2007) (opening statement of Sen. Grassley) (“I’m worried that some members have their head in the 
clouds when it comes to the tax gap.  Some members view the tax gap as money in the pocket to spend 
on favorite proposals.  Nothing could be further from the truth.”). 
17 IRS, Tax Gap Figures, at 3 (2001), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/tax_gap_ 
figures.pdf. 
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income, 57%, and for farm income, an astounding 72%.18  Meanwhile, 
compliance rates for income subject to automatic withholding (wages and 
salaries) and information reporting (interest and dividend income) hovered 
around 99 and 95%, respectively.19  Proceeding on the assumption that 
people pay taxes only when they have to, and that increased enforcement 
by itself was not an effective alternative,20 the majority of tax gap 
proposals expanded information reporting.21  But this approach barely 
dented the $353 billion shortfall.22  In addition to yielding too little 
revenue, critics charged that the approach threatened taxpayer privacy, 
burdened taxpayers with excessive compliance costs, and tipped the 
regulatory balance decidedly away from taxpayer service.23 
With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the “low-hanging fruit” 
has already been picked by withholding and information reporting regimes.  
It is other forms of income—some perched on upper branches, some 
hidden from view at the subterranean level—that continue to elude tax 
officials.  Capturing this income and reducing the massive avoidance of 
taxes in a meaningful way requires a multifaceted approach to a difficult 
problem that only seems to be getting worse.24  The government has three 
                                                                                                                          
18 Id. at 2. 
19 See id.  For the influence of these reporting regimes on tax compliance, see Leandra Lederman, 
Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 697–
99 (2007); Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance and the Reformed IRS, 51 KAN. L. REV. 971, 972–76 
(2003). 
20 The Treasury Department has concluded that enforcement by itself cannot close the gap, 
because: (i) much of the tax gap is due to forms of unreported income that are difficult to detect (i.e., no 
third-party reporting); (ii) even if detected, tax liability might be uncollectible (due to difficulties in 
locating the taxpayer or taxpayer insolvency); and (iii) many detected liabilities are so small that it is 
not cost effective to pursue collection.  JAMES M. BICKLEY, TAX GAP AND TAX ENFORCEMENT, CRS 
REPORT, at 4 (2007), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33882_20070216.pdf.  
21 See Diane Freda, Information Reporting Proposals May Become Congressional Revenue 
Raisers, IRPAC Says, 206 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) at G-1 (Oct. 25, 2007) (describing efforts to 
increase reporting).  
22 Nearly 98% of the estimated increase in compliance receipts from the administration’s tax gap 
recommendations relied on improved information reporting, which were estimated to generate only 
$29.5 billion over ten years, not quite 1% of the estimated gap.  See Dep’t of the Treasury, General 
Explanations, supra note 7, at 120–21.  
23 See, e.g., SENATE REPUBLICAN POLICY COMMITTEE, CLOSING THE TAX GAP: NOT THE ‘POT OF 
GOLD’ THAT SOME HOPE TO DISCOVER 1 (2007),  http://rpc.senate.gov/public/_files/031307TaxGapSN 
.pdf (stating that the administration’s proposals were overly intrusive, adversely altered the relationship 
between the government and the taxpayer, and insufficiently accounted for “taxpayers dignity, privacy, 
and their loss of time due to compliance requirements”); Internal Revenue Service FY 2008 Budget 
Request: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Services and Gen. Gov’t, S. Appropriations Comm., 
109th Cong. 4 (2007), available at http://appropriations.senate.gov/Hearings/2007_05_09_ 
Testimony_of_Nina_Olson_at_the_May_9_Financial_Services_and_General_Government_Subcommit
tee_Hearing.pdf?CFID=40356114&CFTOKEN=32695686 (written statement of Nina E. Olson, 
National Taxpayer Advocate) (noting that under the administration plan, “the IRS would be spending 
literally twice as much on enforcement as it spends on taxpayer service”).   
24 The tax gap for 1973 amounted to $28.8 billion, IRS News Release, IRS Sees A Large and 
Growing Tax Gap, 20 TAX NOTES 555, 555 (1983), reflecting 91.2% compliance, Daniel Bernick, 
Treasury, Practitioners Assess Prospects in Compliance Area, 20 TAX NOTES 101, 101 (1983), 
compared to 83.7% compliance for 2001.  See supra note 2.  Moreover, assuming that the tax gap 
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choices.  It can continue picking away at the far fringes of the tax gap.  It 
can impose draconian measures of coercive enforcement, for which there is 
no political will, nor any good argument even if there were.25  Or it can 
consider the virtues of cooperative tax regulation. 
This Article describes these virtues and articulates an approach to tax 
regulation based on cooperation, information sharing, and interest 
convergence.  It argues that closing the tax gap requires a relational rather 
than a coercive tax compliance norm.  Such a norm necessitates that tax 
regulators nurture compliance with both sweeter carrots and sharper sticks.  
A compliance equilibrium based on reciprocity rather than adversity 
provides positive incentives for taxpayers and tax regulators to trade 
secrecy for certainty.  Under a cooperative model, taxpayers and their 
advisors enjoy certainty of outcome with respect to tax reporting positions 
and fewer post-filing challenges.  At the same time, the government is in a 
better position to identify emerging taxpayer issues and compliance risks, 
and to shift limited resources from post-filing controversies to other areas 
of service and enforcement.  Such an exchange relationship, characterized 
by dialogue and transparency, seeks to forge a shared understanding of 
what it means to comply with the tax law.  By no means does the 
cooperative approach outlined in this Article reject penalties or 
enforcement as part of an overall compliance strategy.  To the contrary, it 
recognizes explicitly that taxpayers will comply with the law in the 
presence of effective deterrence and enforcement.26  But it also recognizes 
that penalties alone and aggressive enforcement will not necessarily 
improve compliance, and may actually worsen it.27  The challenge for tax 
officials under the cooperative model “is to play a two-handed game: To 
deal with the wrongdoing today, while nurturing consent for tomorrow.”28  
A cooperative rather than an adversarial compliance norm may appear 
                                                                                                                          
grows in proportion to increased tax liability, the $353 billion gap for 2001 is equivalent to $400 billion 
for 2006.  ERIC TODER, URBAN INST. AND URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX POL’Y CTR., REDUCING THE TAX 
GAP: THE ILLUSION OF PAIN-FREE DEFICIT REDUCTION 1 (2007), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/ 
UploadedPDF/411496_reducing_tax_gap_revised.pdf. 
25 See Joyce, supra note 5, at G-1 (quoting Commissioner Everson as saying, “[t]o reduce the tax 
gap dramatically would take some draconian steps, ones that would fundamentally change the 
relationship between taxpayers and the IRS, require unacceptably high commitment of enforcement 
resources, and risk imposing unacceptable burdens on compliant taxpayers”); Reducing the Federal 
Tax Gap, supra note 8, at 18 (“[W]hile it may be possible to take action to reduce the tax gap, it is not 
possible to implement a policy that eliminates the tax gap without an unacceptable change in the 
fundamental nature of the current tax compliance system.”). 
26 See Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod, Toward an Agenda for Behavioral Public Finance, 
in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE 3, 15–17 (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod eds., 2006) (arguing 
that enforcement provides taxpayers with an extrinsic motivation to comply with tax laws); see also 
infra notes 36–38 and accompanying text.  
27 See infra note 53 and accompanying text.  
28 Valerie Braithwaite, Dancing with Tax Authorities: Motivational Postures and Non-compliant 
Actions, in TAXING DEMOCRACY: UNDERSTANDING TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION 15, 35 (Valerie 
Braithwaite ed., 2003) [hereinafter TAXING DEMOCRACY].  
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inapposite in the tax context.  After all, the goals of taxpayers and their 
advisors on the one hand and tax regulators on the other are largely 
adverse, with taxpayers trying to reduce and avoid taxes at the same time 
that tax regulators try to collect them.  This Article argues that the interests 
of taxpayers and tax authorities are not all that dissimilar, particularly once 
we start thinking of taxpayers as interested partners in the regulatory effort 
and tax advisors as compliance counselors.29  From this perspective, 
paying one’s taxes yields tangible benefits beyond penalty avoidance, 
while advising taxpayer clients resembles the work performed by securities 
lawyers; the compliance norm is not “do you have a plausible explanation 
for your position,” but rather “does your position reinforce the public 
purposes of the law.”  Tax officials also must adopt new perspectives 
under the cooperative model.  If we make taxpayers, in the words of 
Justice Holmes, “turn square corners” when dealing with the government,30 
it is hard to see why the government should not be held to a similar 
standard of “rectangular rectitude” when dealing with its taxpayer-
citizens.31  Cooperative tax regulation requires tax authorities to assist 
taxpayers, share information with them, and respond to their concerns.  
The regulatory model articulated in this Article adopts an approach 
reflected in the “new governance” and “responsive regulation” literatures.  
New governance involves “a shift in emphasis away from command-and-
control in favour of ‘regulatory’ approaches which are less rigid, less 
prescriptive, less committed to uniform outcomes, and less hierarchical in 
nature.”32  Responsive regulation, for its part, emphasizes a dynamic, non-
adversarial approach where regulators assist regulated actors in complying 
with the law, and where regulated actors, as reward for their cooperation, 
assist regulators in crafting the regulatory environment.33  Scholars have 
                                                                                                                          
29 Legal scholar Robert Gordon has advocated a similar shift in thinking among corporate 
lawyers.  See Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35 
CONN. L. REV. 1185 (2003). 
30 Rock Island, Ark. & La. R.R. Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920). 
31 John MacArthur Maguire & Philip Zimet, Hobson’s Choice and Similar Practices in Federal 
Taxation, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1299 (1935).  
32 Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott, Introduction to LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU 
AND THE US 2, (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006).  The most recognizable American 
scholar associated with the new governance approach is William Simon.  See William H. Simon, 
Toyota Jurisprudence: Legal Theory and Rolling Rule Regimes, in id. at 37–38; William H. Simon, 
After Confidentiality: Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities of the Business Lawyer, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 1464 (2006) [hereinafter Simon, After Confidentiality].  New governance 
shares an intellectual heritage with the more ubiquitous “democratic institutionalism.”  See, e.g., 
Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. 
REV. 267, 469–73 (1998) (proposing a new form of government, “democratization, through 
experimentalist connection,” in which power is decentralized, information is pooled, and subnational 
units of government are free to set and attain their own goals).  
33 See generally IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING 
THE DE-REGULATION DEBATE (1992); JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & RESPONSIVE 
REGULATION (2002).  
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begun to apply the responsive regulation model to tax.34 According to its 
most prolific proponent, Australian tax scholar Valerie Braithwaite, “[t]he 
traditional tax infrastructure of law, auditors, penalties, debt collectors, and 
court cases needs to be supplemented by measures that boost taxpayers’ 
commitment to paying tax with or without the tax authority watching over 
their shoulders.”35  This Article applies these regulatory approaches to U.S. 
tax regulation, particularly the corresponding virtues of an exchange 
relationship under which all parties—tax authorities, taxpayers, and tax 
practitioners—commit to transparency and information sharing, and where 
the government rewards compliance with leniency, flexible 
accommodation, and an opportunity to shape legal rules.  
The Article proceeds in four sections.  Part II applies the cooperative 
model to the existing tax penalty regime.  While strict tax penalties 
typically embody the failed command-and-control approach to regulation, 
an effective compliance strategy requires regulatory sticks.  Thus, Part II 
looks beyond the traditional economic deterrence model for tax penalties 
and explores non-economic motivations for complying with tax laws to 
help re-conceive the penalty regime.  It recommends an interactive 
approach to tax regulation that rewards compliance with restraint, 
assistance, opportunities to participate in the rulemaking process, and even 
tax rebates.  Part II also emphasizes that the government must act swiftly 
and effectively against intransigent noncompliance which, unchecked, 
undermines the cooperative model. 
Part III challenges tax regulators to improve enforcement (which 
includes much more than penalties) as well as customer service.  Like the 
rest of the Article, Part III argues that people will comply with the law if 
the law uses effective and fair mechanisms of deterrence, enforcement, 
prosecution, and punishment.  On the enforcement side, Part III proposes 
increasing the number and thoroughness of audits, shrinking the “resource 
gap” and “information gap” that currently separates government lawyers 
from private sector lawyers, and facilitating private enforcement of tax 
laws.  On the service side, it emphasizes a cultural shift in tax 
administration from command-and-control to collaboration, from ex post 
controversy to ex ante resolution, and from regulatory intimidation to 
procedural fairness.   
Part IV examines the woefully deficient professional standards 
currently governing tax practitioners.  It argues that weak regulation of tax 
practice by the professional associations—particularly the American Bar 
Association and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants—
                                                                                                                          
34 See, e.g., Valerie Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation and Taxation: Introduction, 29 LAW & 
POL’Y 1 (2007). 
35 Valerie Braithwaite, A New Approach to Tax Compliance, in TAXING DEMOCRACY, supra note 
28, at 1.  
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has enabled tax avoidance.  Moreover, it commends recent efforts by 
Congress and the Treasury Department to elevate ethical guidelines for tax 
practitioners.  Finally, it recommends a set of substantive legal rules and 
disclosure requirements designed to improve tax compliance by making 
tax planning and tax reporting more transparent.  
As part of the effort to enhance compliance through increased 
transparency, tax officials need at their disposal a judicious mix of rules 
and standards.  Part V discusses how rules provide certainty of outcome 
and lower compliance costs, as well as enhanced due process and fair 
treatment.  It also shows how standards provide coherence to a set of 
otherwise independent rules by giving them overarching purpose.  Part V 
roots this discussion in an examination of the Treasury Department’s 
regulations governing tax practice.  It explores the extent to which the 
combination of disciplinary rules and aspirational standards contained in 
the regulations both reflect and conflict with cooperative tax regulation. 
II.  RE-CONCEIVING THE PENALTY REGIME 
Taxpayers comply with the law when they think the law will be 
enforced.  Indeed, taxpayer behavior depends largely “[on] the government 
itself,”36 both the fairness of its processes37 and its willingness to enforce 
the law effectively and to prosecute wrongdoers.38  Heavy-handed attempts 
at enforcement by regulators can backfire, however, resulting in less rather 
than more compliance.39  The difficulty for tax authorities is crafting a 
regulatory regime that uses sticks as effectively as carrots.  
Historically, the primary enforcement mechanism for U.S. tax officials 
has been a penalty regime based on an economic deterrence model of 
detection and punishment.  The basic idea behind the economic model is 
that people respond rationally to maximize expected gain and to minimize 
expected loss.  Thus, to deter non-compliance, regulators raise the 
magnitude of penalties or the probability of detection.  The problem for tax 
officials is that for penalties to effectively deter non-compliance under the 
rational economic model, penalty rates would have to be raised to 
unrealistically high levels.  If we assume an audit rate of 2%, twice the 
level of the current rate,40 and we further assume that the IRS always (and 
                                                                                                                          
36 McCaffery & Slemrod, supra note 26, at 17. 
37 See Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, Trust Breeds Trust: How Taxpayers Are Treated, 3 ECON. 
GOVERNANCE 87 (2002) (arguing that a tax authority’s legitimacy depends on fair procedures of tax 
collection and enforcement). 
38 See Margaret Levi, A State of Trust, in TRUST AND GOVERNANCE 77, 91 (Valerie Braithwaite 
& Margaret Levi eds., 1998) (writing that “the willingness to pay taxes quasi-voluntarily or to give 
one’s contingent consent to conscription often rests on the existence of the state’s capacity and 
demonstrated readiness to secure the compliance of the otherwise noncompliant”).  
39 See infra note 53 and accompanying text.  
40 See infra note 126 and accompanying text.  
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only) catches noncompliance on audit (another optimistic assumption), the 
penalty rate sufficient to deter underpayment would have to equal 4900% 
of tax due.41  Suffice it to say, the economic deterrence model is incapable 
of curbing noncompliance by itself. 
While the motivations underlying tax compliance undoubtedly include 
economic considerations, rationality involves more than economic inputs.  
A tax penalty regime that appreciates these other incentives would 
recognize moral, ethical, and social considerations for paying taxes, and it 
would view tax penalties as more than punitive instruments.  A regime that 
merely punishes wrongdoers creates an adversarial environment and 
compliance norm.  By comparison, a cooperative tax penalty regime 
reflects collaborative norms, whereby taxpayers and tax regulators work 
together, and where taxpayer compliance is rewarded with leniency, 
technical assistance, and opportunities to participate in the development of 
legal rules.  A cooperative regime must also be able to identify 
noncompliant behavior, and respond to intransigent noncompliance with 
escalating sanctions and intervention, which, if ignored, would undermine 
the cooperative model.  To the extent positive incentives do not sufficiently 
facilitate compliance among recalcitrant tax avoiders, tax authorities 
should consider no-fault penalties.  The imposition of a strict-liability 
penalty could drastically alter the taxpaying calculus, adding significant 
risk to overaggressive tax positions and transactions. 
A.  From Economic Deterrence to Cooperative Regulation: Sweeter 
Carrots, Sharper Sticks 
Modern discussions of economic deterrence trace their roots to 
economist Gary Becker’s influential work in the 1960s and 1970s on the 
relationship between crime and penalties, both real and perceived.42  
Becker’s economic theory of crime restated the goal of penalties as the 
internalization of the social costs of offenses, rather than the elimination of 
pain.  In the early 1970s, economists Michael Allingham and Agnar 
Sandmo extended Becker’s general theory of deterrence to tax compliance, 
and argued that the degree of deterrence, calculated as the product of the 
probability of detection and the size of the penalty, determines the amount 
of income evaded for any particular taxpayer.43  For the next decade, 
                                                                                                                          
41 The relevant formula can be expressed as P = (1 - d) / d, where P is the penalty per dollar of 
underpayment, and d is the probability of detection.  This example is admittedly stylistic, and assumes 
that the 2% audit rate is completely random, rather than correlating with potential tax-shelter 
participants.  In addition, the computation fails to account for the probability of conviction in addition 
to detection. 
42 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 
169–72 (1968) (developing an economic model for understanding the relationship between crime and 
punishment). 
43 Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 1 J. 
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researchers employed increasingly sophisticated economic models, trading 
varying degrees of punishment and deterrence to locate the optimal tax 
compliance package. 
Researchers found that maximizing economic gain or minimizing 
economic loss could not fully explain why people comply with the law; 
real-world penalty rates were simply too low to explain the relatively high 
rates of compliance.44  It became clear that compliance was not only about 
risk aversion, and that the economic analysis of deterrence over-simplified 
why people pay taxes by ignoring other explanatory variables.45  
Researchers were forced to conclude that models associated with economic 
theories of tax compliance provided, at best, “tentative guidance . . . in 
well-specified circumstances.”46  It is worth examining briefly the findings 
to evaluate the role economic deterrence can still play in a re-imagined 
penalty regime. 
Survey research predicts a positive impact of deterrence on avoidance 
and evasion with higher fines and higher rates of enforcement.47  Empirical 
research reveals more ambiguity, with some studies reporting a positive 
impact of penalties on compliance,48 and others reporting a positive impact 
of higher probability of detection.49  Researchers examining both fines and 
probability of detection report a positive but small impact on compliance,50 
                                                                                                                          
PUB. ECON. 323, 324 (1972). 
44 See James Alm et al., Why Do People Pay Taxes? 48 J. PUB. ECON. 21, 36 (1992) (finding that 
individuals “often pay more in taxes than a simple application of expected utility theory would 
suggest”). 
45 See id.; Michael J. Graetz & Louis L. Wilde, The Economics of Tax Compliance: Facts and 
Fantasy, 38 NAT’L TAX J. 355, 357 (1985) (criticizing the application of the economics of crime 
methodology to tax evasion and avoidance). 
46 John Creedy, Tax Modeling, in TAXATION AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR: INTRODUCTORY 
SURVEYS IN ECONOMICS 133, 135–36 (John Creedy ed., 2001). 
47 See, e.g., Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration, in 
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1423 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002); James 
Andreoni et al., Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 818, 841 (1998) (“[H]igher penalties and audit 
probabilities discourage cheating.”). 
48 See, e.g., James Alm et al., Economic and Non-Economic Factors in Tax Compliance, 48 
KYKLOS 3, 12 (1995) (“When the fine rate increases, the number of individuals at zero compliance falls 
greatly, and the number at full compliance rises accordingly.”); Ana De Juan et al., Voluntary Tax 
Compliant Behavior of Spanish Income Taxpayers, 49 PUB. FIN. (SUPP). 90, 97 (1994); Steven Klepper 
& Daniel Nagin, Tax Compliance and Perceptions of the Risks of Detection and Criminal Prosecution, 
23 LAW & SOC. REV. 209, 238–39 (1989). 
49 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Dubin & Louis L. Wilde, An Empirical Analysis of Federal Income Tax 
Auditing and Compliance, 41 NAT’L TAX J. 61, 61 (1988); Jeffrey A. Dubin et al., Are We a Nation of 
Tax Cheaters?: New Econometric Evidence on Tax Compliance, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 240, 241 (1987) 
(“[A]n exogenous increase in the probability of detection and conviction or in the penalty rate will 
increase compliance.”); A. Mitchel Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic 
Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 879 (1998); Joel Slemrod et al., Taxpayer Response to an Increased 
Probability of Audit: Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota, 79 J. PUB. ECON. 455, 
456–57 (2001) (finding that “treatment effect varies depending on the level of income” and that “[t]he 
effect was much stronger for those with more ‘opportunity’ to evade”). 
50 See, e.g., James Alm et al., Deterrence and Beyond: Toward a Kinder, Gentler IRS, in WHY 
PEOPLE PAY TAXES 311, 322–23 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) (“[C]ompliance . . . rises when the audit rate 
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while other researchers have generated ambiguous results as to the effect 
of fines and detection.51  In fact, some studies report a “crowding out” of 
tax compliance when penalties are introduced with a corresponding 
increase in evasion.52 
If we believe that taxpayers, even perfectly rational, utility-maximizing 
taxpayers, care about considerations beyond narrowly defined economic 
self-interest, it should come as no surprise that penalties can lower rather 
than raise compliance.  Thirty years of research has demonstrated that 
deterring noncompliant behavior is not entirely about economic self-
interest or subjective probabilities of detection that merely augment the 
standard economic model.53  Rather, regulating tax compliance involves 
considerations extending beyond economics, and while some of these 
motivations can be reduced to monetary values, others cannot.  A growing 
number of researchers have shown that moral, ethical, and social factors—
more than threats of economic or legal punishment—determine whether 
and how taxpayers comply with the law.54  Similar considerations might 
even dissuade tax professionals from advising overaggressive planning 
strategies.55  At the very least, thirty-five years after Allingham and 
                                                                                                                          
increases.  However, the differences in compliance rates . . . are not large.”); Dick J. Hessing et al., 
Does Deterrence Deter? Measuring the Effect of Deterrence on Tax Compliance in Field Studies and 
Experimental Studies, in id. 291, 292 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992). 
51 See, e.g., Hank Elffers et al., The Consequences of Different Strategies for Measuring Tax 
Evasion Behavior, 8 J. ECON. PSYCH. 311, 324 (1987); Nehemia Friedland, A Note on Tax Evasion as a 
Function of the Quality of Information About the Magnitude and Credibility of Threatened Fines: Some 
Preliminary Research, 12 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 54, 55 (1982); Kimberly N. Varma & Anthony N. 
Doob, Deterring Economic Crimes: The Case of Tax Evasion, 40 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY 165, 165–66 
(1998). 
52 The basic idea behind this finding is that taxpayers balance extrinsic motivations for paying 
taxes (i.e., penalties and enforcement) with intrinsic motivations (i.e., individual framing decisions such 
as feelings of civic virtue and desires to avoid shame and stigma), and that raising extrinsic motivations 
may fail to compensate for the corresponding incursion on intrinsic motivations.  Braithwaite, supra 
note 28, at 34–35; Doreen McBarnet, When Compliance Is Not the Solution but the Problem: From 
Changes in Law to Changes in Attitude, in TAXING DEMOCRACY, supra note 28, at 229; Bruno S. Frey, 
A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues, 107 ECON. J. 1043, 1044–46 (1997); Mark Lubell 
& John T. Scholz, Cooperation, Reciprocity, and the Collective-Action Heuristic, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
160, 173–75 (2001). 
53 Bruno S. Frey & Lars P. Feld, Deterrence and Morale in Taxation: An Empirical Analysis 8–11 
(CESifo Working Paper No. 760, 2002). 
54 See, e.g., Marsha Blumenthal et al., Do Normative Appeals Affect Tax Compliance?: Evidence 
from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 125, 126–28 (2001); Brian Erard & 
Jonathan S. Feinstein, The Role of Moral Sentiments and Audit Perceptions in Tax Compliance, 49 
PUB. FIN. (SUPP.) 70, 74–77 (1994); Josef Falkinger, Tax Evasion, Consumption of Public Goods, and 
Fairness, 16 J. ECON. PSYCH. 63, 63 (1995); Michael S. Kirsch, Alternative Sanctions and the Federal 
Tax Law: Symbols, Shaming, and Social Norm Management as a Substitute for Effective Tax Policy, 89 
IOWA L. REV. 863, 865–69 (2004); Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement 
in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1459–62 (2003); Laurie Mason & Robert L. Mason, A 
Moral Appeal for Taxpayer Compliance: The Case for a Mass Media Campaign, 14 LAW & POL’Y 
381, 381–82 (1992); Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. 
REV. 1781, 1782 (2000). 
55 See, e.g., Richard Lavoie, Deputizing the Gunslingers: Co-opting the Tax Bar into Dissuading 
Corporate Tax Shelters, 21 VA. TAX REV. 43, 73 97–98 (2001) (stressing the importance of appealing 
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Sandmo animated the discussion of why people pay (and don’t pay) taxes, 
there is a consensus that moral, ethical, and social strategies can and should 
complement traditional punishment and deterrence strategies. 
A number of recent proposals for reforming the penalty regime 
account for multiple taxpaying motivations.  None of them reject 
altogether the economic deterrence model, and some offer sophisticated 
refinements whereby rational taxpayers consider avoidance and evasion 
strategies based on expected rather than nominal sanctions.56  These 
proposals build on considerations that previous researchers may have noted 
but either assumed away or failed to explore fully, such as how non-
economic and extra-economic motivations interact with the standard 
economic model.  As importantly, they provide strategies for restructuring 
the tax penalty regime to reflect cooperative tax regulation. 
Restructuring the penalty regime to recognize multiple taxpaying 
motivations requires acknowledging the power of social norms.  These 
legally unenforceable rules of behavior operate beyond the reach of the 
current tax penalty system.  Aggressive taxpayers and their advisors, 
moreover, have captured the power of social norms to the detriment of the 
tax system and other taxpayers57 by engaging in “norm-based tax 
planning,” the tacit, informal understandings that reduce tax liabilities and 
create tax-shifting distortions.58 
Though social norms can undermine the tax system, they can also 
reinforce it.  In fact, tax compliance norms shared by tax decision-makers 
at large public corporations have had a positive impact on compliance in 
recent years.  These norms have produced “general liability concerns 
within organizations” from the corporate taxpayer, outside legal counsel, 
                                                                                                                          
to lawyers’ conscience rather than self-interest as a way to stop the use of abusive tax shelters); Tanina 
Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers: The Organized Tax Bar and the Tax Shelter Industry, 23 YALE J. REG. 
77, 81 (2006) (arguing that elite corporate lawyers and the tax bar supported recent changes to 
professional standards due to a “nuanced conception of professionalism”). 
56 E.g., Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, and the Self-
Adjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 569 (2006) (introducing a self-adjusting penalty equal to the 
fraction of legitimately claimed subtractions to income reported on the same line containing illegitimate 
subtractions to income); David M. Schizer, Enlisting the Tax Bar, 59 TAX L. REV. 331, 358, 368 (2006) 
(calling on Congress to raise “marginal deterrence” and increase sanctions on practitioners by having 
them bear part of the understatement penalty “when a deal they blessed is successfully challenged”). 
57 Alex Raskolnikov, The Cost of Norms: Tax Effects of Tacit Understandings, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 
601 (2007). 
58 Raskolnikov elegantly discusses several examples of informal tax-driven norms, including 
arrangements associated with the hedging strategy known as variable delivery prepaid forward 
contracts, id. at 613–16, loan tranches, id. at 616–18, and the relationship between equity swaps and 
notional principle contracts, id. at 618–20.  Other scholars warn that tax rules by themselves are 
incapable of altering industry norms.  E.g., Steven A. Bank, Tax, Corporate Governance, and Norms, 
61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1159, 1228–30 (2004) (finding that statutory tax law has historically failed to 
alter norms of corporate behavior with respect to cash retention policies and corporate reorganizations); 
Kirsch, supra note 54, at 916–21 (demonstrating the ineffectiveness of tax provisions designed to 
reduce tax-motivated expatriations). 
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and accounting firms.59  According to law professor Susan Morse, these tax 
compliance norms developed as a result of enforcement efforts “wholly 
unrelated to tax,”60 and were instead the product of statutory changes to 
disclosure and governance procedures for corporations.61  The tax 
compliance norm that Morse identifies, as well as the organizational and 
group dynamics that she describes,62 suggest that government efforts 
designed explicitly to facilitate tax compliance may have an even more 
powerful effect on tax decision-makers within corporations and on outside 
tax advisors.  Given Morse’s findings, for instance, recent Treasury 
regulations establishing vicarious liability for tax practitioners responsible 
for overseeing a firm’s tax practice may have already altered risk and 
liability concerns within firms and among advisors.63 
Self-interest is never far from the surface, a reality that can help as 
much as hinder efforts to forge cooperative tax regulation.  To level the 
playing field on which taxpayers and tax regulators play, for instance, tax 
scholar David Schizer recommends asking private lawyers “to help the 
government in a way that also helps their clients.”64  Schizer envisions a 
partnership between taxpayers, tax advisors, and tax authorities that would 
raise compliance by explicitly rewarding compliant behavior.  Self-
interested incentives for assisting reform could involve narrowing 
overbroad anti-abuse rules;65 rewarding lawyers and law firms that issue 
conservative opinions by granting them leeway in the examination 
process;66 expediting the revenue ruling and pre-filing processes for 
conservative lawyers;67 and further bolstering the reputation of 
conservative advisors by publishing a list of deviant practitioners.68  If just 
a few of the players privy to the “common knowledge of tax abuse”69 
withdrew from the game, the stakes would go down (or up, as it were), as 
former participants partnered with the government—again, if only for self-
                                                                                                                          
59 Susan Cleary Morse, The How and Why of the New Public Corporation Tax Shelter 
Compliance Norm, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 961, 964 (2006). 
60 Id.  
61 For fuller discussion of the changes, see infra notes 265–72 and accompanying text.  
62 See Morse, supra note 59, at 984–94. 
63 See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 10.36 (2007) (subjecting to discipline practitioners with principal 
authority for overseeing a firm’s tax practice for failure to take reasonable steps to prevent behavior not 
in compliance with federal regulations).  
64 Schizer, supra note 56, at 333.  
65 Id. at 357–58.  For discussion of anti-abuse rules, see infra notes 280–86 and accompanying 
text.  
66 See Schizer, supra note 56, at 361–62 (“Lawyers will want conservative reputations, and clients 
will want to hire such lawyers, if the government treats opinions of conservative lawyers more 
favorably than opinions of aggressive ones.”). 
67 Id. at 362.  
68 See id. (“[T]he government . . . [could] keep a list of aggressive advisors.”).  In 2008, the IRS 
began posting on its website final disciplinary decisions for violations of Treasury regulations 
governing standards of tax practice by tax practitioners.  See infra note 311 and accompanying text.  
69 Mark P. Gergen, The Common Knowledge of Tax Abuse, 54 SMU L. REV. 131, 131 (2001). 
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interested reasons—armed with enough knowledge and market power to 
undermine Gresham’s Law.70  Moreover, if former participants blew the 
whistle on tax cheats, perhaps lured by the financial bounties offered under 
the redesigned IRS whistleblower program,71 government interests and tax 
practitioner interests would be further aligned.  
A number of commentators extend the partnership model even more 
explicitly to cultivate cooperative behavior among taxpayers and tax 
advisors.  These voices call for more responsive regulation in broadening 
the definition of deterrence to include “measures that nurture the social 
responsibility and ethics of taxpayers,” and that embrace “a dynamic 
framework” reflecting “the interplay of the taxpayer/tax-authority 
interaction.”72  An expanded conception of deterrence borrows from the 
“general prevention” approach in the literature on crime, and, according to 
legal scholar Sagit Leviner, is designed to improve compliance “not only 
by means of curbing illegal activity but also by encouraging legal behavior, 
such as by balancing authoritarian deterrence with positive encouragement 
and assistance.”73  Taxpayer cooperation could be further induced with a 
mix of cognitive tricks that exploit taxpayers’ preference for policies 
described as bonuses rather than their punitive opposites, such as offering 
tax rebates for filing taxes on time and without subsequent errors.74  Under 
the partnership model, tax regulators extend to taxpayers “cooperation, 
positive and helpful service, and open dialogue as a first response to 
conflicts.”75  If a taxpayer refuses the initial offer of cooperation, tax 
regulators would respond firmly but fairly, slowly ratcheting up 
enforcement to encourage compliance while continuing to offer 
                                                                                                                          
70 “Gresham’s Law” refers to bad money driving out good money.  In the context of tax practice, 
Gresham’s Law refers to “bad” or “low-minded” tax advisors driving out “good” or “public-minded” 
tax advisors.   
71 See infra notes 164–73 and accompanying text.  
72 Sagit Leviner, A New Era of Tax Enforcement:  From “Big Stick” to Responsive Regulation, 
1500 IRS RES. BULL.:  RECENT RES. ON TAX ADMIN. & COMPLIANCE 241, 271–72 (2006), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/productsandpubs/article/0,,id=151642,00.html (follow “A New Era of Tax 
Enforcement:  From ‘Big Stick’ to Reponsive [sic] Regulation” hyperlink); see also Braithwaite, supra 
note 35, at 3–5 (suggesting responsive regulation should be applied to the tax system); Braithwaite, 
supra note 28, at 15, 35 (arguing for a dynamic approach to containing tax avoidance problems); Lars 
P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psychological Tax Contract: The Role of 
Incentives and Responsive Regulation 3, 6, 17, 19–20 (Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Univ. of 
Zurich, Working Paper No. 287, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=900366 (commenting on 
the relationship between taxpayers and tax authorities). 
73 Leviner, supra note 72, at 255–56.  
74 The cognitive trick here involves describing payment of taxes as a bonus rather than 
nonpayment of taxes as a penalty.  The field of behavioral economics has long recognized the centrality 
of “framing” on decision-making and expressed preferences.  Researchers have begun to demonstrate 
the relevance of framing to tax compliance.  See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, 
Framing and Taxation:  Evaluation of Tax Policies Involving Household Composition, 25 J. ECON. 
PSYCHOL. 679 (2004); Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, The Humpty Dumpty Blues: 
Disaggregation Bias in the Evaluation of Tax Systems, 91 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. 
DECISION PROCESSES 230, 232, 241 (2003).  
75 Leviner, supra note 72, at 263.  
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cooperation as a reward.  By “genuinely rewarding taxpayers in an 
exchange relationship,” economists Lars Feld and Bruno Frey suggest, tax 
regulators can increase tax compliance by improving “tax morale.”76  More 
than a partnership, the taxpayer and tax regulator enter into a 
“psychological tax contract” that, like other contracts, involves reciprocal 
rights and duties.77  The psychological tax contract requires taxpayers and 
tax regulators to “treat each other like partners . . . with mutual respect and 
honesty” throughout the planning, auditing, and litigation stages of the 
relationship.78 
Lest this partnership mentality conjure images of holding hands and 
singing “Kumbaya” around the campfire, it is imperative to place it in the 
context of give-and-take tax regulation.  Substituting a shared governance 
equilibrium for an adversarial equilibrium necessarily requires that 
regulators and taxpayers work together in ways previously unimagined.  A 
partnership mentality does not necessarily equate with lax enforcement or 
insufficient consequences for noncompliant behavior.  Indeed, according to 
Dave Hartnett, Director General of the United Kingdom’s HMRC (Her 
Majesty’s Revenue and Custom, formerly, Inland Revenue), initiatives in 
Great Britain aimed at fostering a collaborative compliance norm have 
successfully avoided creating an environment where tax regulators are 
“pink and fluffy and only supportive.”79  British officials have been “very 
demanding of business and those who advise them,” requiring heightened, 
timely disclosures to help “make the system work.”80  The reciprocal 
exchange provides taxpayers more certainty, while the government 
receives valuable information about taxpaying behavior.  In addition, the 
information gleaned from the partnership model of tax regulation can assist 
tax officials in better distinguishing between compliant and noncompliant 
taxpayers.81  Current evaders and aggressive avoiders may still engage in 
noncompliant behavior in the presence of the partnership model.  But the 
                                                                                                                          
76 Feld & Frey, supra note 72, at 20.  For earlier research on the relationship between tax morale 
and tax compliance, see John G. Cullis & Alan Lewis, Why People Pay Taxes: From a Conventional 
Economic Model to a Model of Social Convention, 18 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 305, 310 (1997), and Benno 
Torgler, Tax Morale and Direct Democracy, 21 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 525, 525–26, 530 (2005).  
77 Feld & Frey, supra note 72, at 20.   
78 Id. at 4; see also Braithwaite, supra note 28, at 17 (stating that while tax authorities may have 
legal legitimacy, that authority “does not guarantee them psychological legitimacy,” a pre-requisite for 
long-term compliance). 
79 Mark A. Weinberger et al., Keynote Panel: Is the Global Wave of Change in Tax Risk Over or 
Just Beginning?, reprinted in 85 TAXES, June 2007, at 38 (remarks of Dave Hartnett, Director General, 
Compliance Strategy & Business, HM Revenue & Customs). 
80 Id.  
81 Increased information could also buttress other signaling techniques (such as which auditors or 
lawyers taxpayers use) that might be integrated into existing IRS programs that classify taxpayer 
behavior into different categories.  See Stephen Joyce, LMSB Launches Issues Classification System to 
Promote Consistency, Cut Currency Time, 48 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) at G-2 (Mar. 13, 2007) 
(discussing the IRS “industry issue focus” approach, a tiered classification system that categorizes 
compliance issues across industry lines).  
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feedback provided by a reciprocal approach can help tax authorities 
identify noncompliant taxpayers and respond with harsher penalties, 
aggressive enforcement, regular audits, and ongoing monitoring.82 
A cooperative model for tax regulation might still appear vulnerable to 
“agency capture.”  Under this theory, regulators fail to uphold the broader 
public interest by falling prey to the influence of powerful regulated 
entities which substitute their own self-serving agenda for the public policy 
agenda.83  Scholars have identified various federal agencies as victims of 
capture, including the Federal Aviation Administration (by the airline 
industry),84 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (by nuclear power 
companies),85 the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food, Safety, and 
Inspection Service (by meat and processed foods industries),86 and the 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (by the National Rifle 
Association).87 
To date, no one has suggested that the IRS is particularly susceptible to 
agency capture.  While it is true that inviting taxpayer input during 
rulemaking lacks the tension among competing public interests that exists 
in other regulatory contexts,88 it seems likely the IRS will remain immune 
to agency capture.  Unlike other agencies, the Service does not interact as 
                                                                                                                          
82 See Tax Disclosures in Financial Statements: The FASB, SEC and IRS Current Perspectives 
and Future, reprinted in 85 TAXES, June 2007, at 58 (remarks of Deborah Nolan, Commissioner, Large 
and Mid-Size Business Division, IRS) (noting that increased information would help tax officials “treat 
taxpayers commensurate with their behavior”). 
83 See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. 
L. REV. 1511, 1565 (1992) (defining the capture hypothesis); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of 
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1682–83 (1975) (summarizing capture theory 
by writing, “[t]o the extent that belief in an objective ‘public interest’ remains, the agencies are accused 
of subverting it in favor of the private interests of regulated and client firms”); see also Jody Freeman, 
The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 547–48 (2000) (describing the “deep 
interdependence among public and private actors in accomplishing the business of governance”); John 
Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713, 723 (1986) 
(attributing the shift in antitrust doctrine toward wider application of federal policy to the evolution of 
agency capture theory).  For critiques of capture theory, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, 
LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 12, 37 (1991) (challenging the prevailing view 
of the influence of special interests); David Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Bargaining in the Shadow of 
Democracy, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 497–98 (1999) (characterizing capture theory as “imprecise and 
controversial”); David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 
GEO. L.J. 97, 104–05 (2000) (suggesting that “this dim view of agency independence is due in part to a 
combination of the methodological imperatives of public choice scholarship and social scientists’ 
desire to avoid normative issues”). 
84 Mark C. Niles, On the Hijacking of Agencies (and Airplanes): The Federal Aviation 
Administration, “Agency Capture,” and Airline Security, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 381 
(2002).  
85 Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on Agency 
Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429 (1999). 
86 Dion Casey, Agency Capture: The USDA’s Struggle to Pass Food Safety Regulations, 7 KAN. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 142 (1998).  
87 Timothy D. Lytton, Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry: A Comparative Institutional Analysis, 
32 CONN. L. REV. 1247 (2000).  
88 Unlike environmental regulatory rulemaking, for instance, where interest groups align on both 
sides of issues, few taxpayers align on the side of the IRS. 
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intimately with the entities it regulates.  Moreover, it does not oversee one 
particular industry with organized representation, but instead regulates 
hundreds of millions of taxpayers in hundreds of thousands of different 
taxable industries, thereby diffusing the potential influence of specific 
interest groups.89  In addition, the IRS does not engage in traditional 
“negotiated rulemaking,” where regulated entities “establish privately 
bargained interests as the source of putative public law.”90  Comparatively, 
the IRS, somewhat perfunctorily, meets the requirements of the 
Administrative Procedure Act,91 publishing notices of proposed 
rulemaking in the Federal Register, and inviting interested parties to 
comment.  Far from producing undue influence, the process can result in 
taxpayers, practitioner groups, industry representatives, and trade 
associations feeling powerless in determining policy outcomes.92  Inviting 
taxpayer input early in the rulemaking process invests taxpayers and their 
advisors in the regulatory effort, and helps overcome feelings of 
helplessness and distrust.  
Cooperative tax regulation operates within a framework of governance 
in which traditional criticisms of agency regulation are inappropriate.  The 
cooperative model emphasizes flexible not rigid regulatory approaches, 
creative not static outcomes, fluidity rather than hierarchy.  This dialectic 
approach achieves a balance of persuasion and punishment that “prevents 
the emergence of widespread taxpayer resistance and fosters goodwill and 
cooperation.”93  Moreover, this model is particularly well-suited to tax, 
where compliance is not always in the interest of taxpayers (especially in 
the short-term), and where the probability of detection is nearly an 
irrelevant consideration given current levels of enforcement.94  
B.  Regulatory Sticks and No-Fault Penalties in an Uncertain World 
Notwithstanding the significant potential of the cooperative model, tax 
regulation in the United States continues to emphasize punishment and 
deterrence.  Recent changes to the penalty regime, moreover, have been 
                                                                                                                          
89 For a similar argument that agencies working across industries are less likely to be captured, 
see generally Jonathan B. Baker, The Case for Antitrust Enforcement, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 27 (2003); 
Jonathan B. Baker, “Continuous” Regulatory Reform at the Federal Trade Commission, 49 ADMIN L. 
REV. 859 (1997). 
90 William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: Regulatory Negotiation and the 
Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L.J. 1351, 1356 (1997).  
91 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 553 (1995) (defining entities subject to the Act and the requirements 
governing their rulemaking).  
92 To the extent capture theory infects tax regulation, it does so at the legislative rather than the 
administrative level.  For a particularly colorful story of tax politics at the legislative level, see 
generally JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH: LAWMAKERS, 
LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM (1987). 
93 Leviner, supra note 72, at 263.  
94 See infra Part III.A (discussing the debilitating resource and information gaps).  
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largely punitive rather than persuasive.  In 2004, Congress passed the 
American Jobs Creation Act (Jobs Act),95 which heightened reporting and 
disclosure requirements96 for “reportable transactions,”97 tax code speak for 
“tax shelters.”98  As an incentive to disclose information with respect to 
tax-motivated transactions, Congress significantly raised existing penalties 
while also adding new ones, only a few of which rewarded disclosure with 
penalty avoidance or lower penalty rates.99  In addition, legislators set more 
stringent requirements for asserting a defense for engaging in reportable 
transactions,100 making it available only in the presence of adequate 
disclosure,101 substantial authority,102 and a reasonable belief that the 
position was “more likely than not” correct.103  Moreover, the Jobs Act 
authorized the Treasury Department to impose stringent monetary penalties 
on practitioners and firms for violating the new reporting obligations.104  In 
particular, the IRS Office of Professional Responsibility may now levy 
                                                                                                                          
95 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).  
96 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6111–12, 6662A, 6707, 6707A (Supp. 2005).  Congress replaced the former 
registration and list maintenance rules with new rules requiring “material advisors” to disclose 
reportable transactions and maintain detailed lists of investors.  See id. § 6111 (material advisor 
reporting requirement); id. § 6112 (material advisor list maintenance requirement).  
97 A “reportable transaction” is the tax code’s term of art for prohibited tax shelter transactions.  
The tax code defines reportable transactions generally as “of a type which the Secretary determines as 
having a potential for tax avoidance or evasion.”  Id. § 6707A(c)(1).  Meanwhile, Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-
4(b)(2) (2007) specifies particular prohibitive transactions, including: (i) “listed” transactions that have 
a “significant tax avoidance purpose,” see id. § 301.6111-2(b)(2), and are the same as, or substantially 
similar to, a transaction specifically identified by the Treasury as a tax avoidance transaction; (ii) 
“confidential” transactions in which the advisor imposes a condition of confidentiality to protect the 
advisor’s planning strategy; (iii) transactions in which the advisor’s fee is contingent on the success of 
the planning strategy; (iv) “loss” transactions in which a gross loss exceeds certain thresholds; and (v) 
“transactions of interest” that have the potential for abuse, but for which the Treasury lacks sufficient 
information to determine whether they should be identified specifically as tax avoidance transactions. 
98 Several I.R.C. provisions still refer to “tax shelters” rather than “reportable transactions,” and 
continue to define the former as a partnership or other entity, any investment plan or arrangement, or 
any other plan or arrangement, if a significant purpose is the avoidance or evasion of federal income 
tax.  E.g., I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C) (Supp. 2005); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(g)(2) (2008). 
99 See I.R.C. § 6700 (2000) (raising the shelter organizer penalty for a false statement from $1000 
to 50% of gross income derived from the activity); id. § 6707 (increasing the penalty for failure to 
register a tax shelter transaction from $500 to $50,000 for reportable transactions other than listed 
transactions and up to 75% of gross income derived from the activity for listed transactions); id. § 
6707A (creating a new taxpayer penalty for failure to disclose a reportable transaction); id. § 6708 
(establishing a new penalty which replaced the $50 penalty for failure to maintain investor lists under § 
6112 with a $10,000 per day penalty for failure to turn over information upon request from the IRS); id. 
§ 6662A (creating a new taxpayer 20% understatement penalty for reportable transactions, increased to 
30% if not disclosed). 
100 See id. § 6664(d) (2000) (establishing exceptions for reportable transaction understatements). 
101 Id. § 6664(d)(2)(A); see also Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6662-3(c)(2), 1.6662-4(e), (f) (2008) (indicating 
the methods for making adequate disclosures).  
102 I.R.C. § 6664(d)(2)(B); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d) (2008) (defining the substantial 
authority standard and method for determining whether it has been met). 
103 I.R.C. § 6664(d)(2)(C)see also Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(g)(4) (2008) (describing when a 
taxpayer is within reason to believe that the tax treatment of an item is more likely than not correct). 
104 See infra notes 303–30 and accompanying text (discussing the penalties for practitioners and 
firms).  
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steep monetary sanctions (that can amount to double the expected fees 
charged for advising a reportable transaction) either in addition to or in lieu 
of other sanctions that may be levied, including censure, suspension, or 
disbarment.105  New rules governing tax practice reinforce the reporting 
requirements by mandating that practitioners affirmatively disclose 
transactions, via written opinions that fail to meet the elevated more likely 
than not standard.106  In 2006, the Treasury Department issued additional 
reporting requirements for an entirely new category of deals called 
“transactions of interest,” which Treasury feels have the potential for abuse 
but for which it lacks sufficient information to determine whether the deals 
should be identified specifically as tax avoidance transactions.107 
Though these changes to the tax compliance regime reflect a typical 
command-and-control style of regulation, they appropriately address 
longstanding information asymmetries separating taxpayers and tax 
regulators.108  Like similar efforts to impose transparency in the corporate 
governance context—with, for instance, disclosure rules under the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act109 and the establishment of the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board110—heightened enforcement and disclosure in 
the tax context can also increase transparency.  In turn, such transparency 
can facilitate certainty in reporting positions, and reduce costs of 
compliance as well as enforcement.  Indeed, whether through “forced” 
transparency in the form of more threatening penalties, categories of 
prohibited transactions, and heightened disclosure rules or through 
“induced” transparency in the form of various pre-filing alternative dispute 
resolution initiatives,111 openness can lead to certainty for both taxpayers 
and the government.  In addition, stiffer penalties and disclosure 
obligations send overt signals to taxpayers and their advisors that the 
government is serious about enforcing the law and prosecuting violators.  
When it is clear that the government means business, researchers have 
                                                                                                                          
105 31 C.F.R. § 10.50 (2007). 
106 Id. § 10.35(b)(2)(i). 
107 AJCA Modifications to the Section 6011 Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. 64,488 (Nov. 2, 2006) (to 
be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 20, 25, 31, 53, 54 and 56).  In September 2007, the IRS specified the 
first two such transactions.  See Notice 2007-72, 2007-36 I.R.B. 544 (indicating that as of August 14, 
2007, a Contribution of Successor Member Interest would be considered a transaction of interest); 
Notice 2007-73, 2007-36 I.R.B. 545 (indicating that as of August 14, 2007, a Toggling Grantor Trust 
would be considered a transaction of interest).  
108 See David M. Schizer, Sticks and Snakes: Derivatives and Curtailing Aggressive Tax 
Planning, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1339, 1348–51 (2000) (discussing the several advantages taxpayers and 
tax lawyers have over the government); see also infra notes 157–62 and accompanying text (arguing 
that even if resources were allocated more evenly, there would still be an “information gap” between 
taxpayers and the government).  
109 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2002).  
110 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211–19 (2000) (establishing the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
and defining its rules and procedures). 
111 See infra notes 196–98 and accompanying text (discussing pre-filing initiatives).  
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shown that taxpayers are more likely to comply with the law.112  This does 
not mean that tax regulators can rely exclusively on ramping up 
enforcement while ignoring service, information sharing, and cooperation.  
It does mean, however, that recent legislative changes to the penalty and 
disclosure regimes, by providing the IRS a fuller array of sticks and 
carrots, might induce taxpayers and their advisors to cooperate in a 
reciprocal tax regulatory environment.  
In the event these incentives fail to alter the behavior of particularly 
intransigent taxpayers, the government should have at its disposal another 
policy option: a no-fault, strict-liability underpayment penalty.  Under this 
approach, reasonableness and good faith do not provide a defense to 
challenged taxpayer positions,113 and legal opinions do not provide penalty 
protection for taxpayers.  In the current world of tax compliance, where 
state of mind determines culpability, and where legal uncertainty lowers 
still further the chance a taxpayer will be found culpable (to say nothing of 
low audit rates that virtually assure asserted positions go unexamined by 
the government),114 the taxpayer has almost no reason to adopt a 
conservative approach when choosing between transactions.  However, in 
a world where state of mind does not absolve the taxpayer, and where 
stricter disclosure rules (even for non-controversial positions) help 
counteract low audit rates, taxpayers might think twice before choosing 
overaggressive transactions.115  Of course, taxpayers may still assert 
overaggressive positions.  But they will have to consider the heightened 
risk before doing so.  
No-fault penalties are not unprecedented.  In fact, the U.S. tax code 
currently uses several of them, though they are targeted to certain 
taxpayers and certain kinds of behavior.116  Furthermore, as law professor 
Daniel Shaviro has noted, once we acknowledge that taxpayers already 
respond strategically to the legal uncertainty surrounding tax law, “no-fault 
penalties should not even be controversial” because taxpayers will account 
                                                                                                                          
112 See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text (indicating that taxpayer behavior is influenced 
by the perception of whether the government will enforce the law).  
113 For current treatment respecting penalty abatement, see IRC § 6664(d) (2000) (reducing § 
6662A penalty pertaining to accuracy-related understatements on reportable transactions “if it is shown 
that there was a reasonable cause for such portion and that the taxpayer acted in good faith with respect 
to such portion”); id. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii) (reducing the substantial understatement penalty for 
understatements pertaining to tax return positions that are adequately disclosed and that possess a 
reasonable basis of being upheld upon challenge).  
114 For a fuller discussion, see infra notes 125–43 and accompanying text.  
115 See Daniel Shaviro, Disclosure and Civil Penalty Rules in the U.S. Legal Response to 
Corporate Tax Shelters 4–5 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law Center for Law, Econ. & Org., Working Paper No. 
07-05, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=955354 (discussing why tax penalties “need not 
have anything to do with wrongdoing”).  
116 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6662(e), (h) (imposing no-fault penalties on certain transfer-pricing 
transactions). 
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for them like other compliance inputs.117  Imposing penalties on all 
taxpayers based purely on objective criteria and without regard to state of 
mind might be susceptible to charges of procedural unfairness depending 
on how the rules are written.  To mitigate such concerns, Congress could 
require the government to pay for the taxpayer’s time and expense if it 
challenges a position and loses.  Moreover, taxpayers could protect 
themselves against the risk of future penalties by turning to the thriving tax 
insurance industry.118  
Opponents of a no-fault penalty might still object to the approach 
given the inherently stochastic nature of tax law.  More so than other areas 
of the law, tax rules often provide no clear law at all, whereby the law 
itself becomes a random variable, with a certain probability that it is X and 
a certain probability that it is Y.  Add the difficulty of assigning particular 
probabilities to different outcomes—in addition to the fact that regulators 
and courts can express preferences for form, substance, or any point in 
between—and making risk assessments becomes a task of partially 
informed guesswork.  In a world of such uncertainty, disclosure rather than 
substantive regulation may be the preferred course.  
The next two sections of the Article address the difficulty of locating 
certainty in tax law.  Part III discusses ways for taxpayers and tax officials 
to enjoy greater certainty through information sharing, collaboration, and 
pre-filing resolution rather than post-filing controversy.  Moreover, it puts 
the government in a better position to act on the information it receives by 
increasing resources in the form of money, personnel, and expertise.  Part 
III also explores various policy opportunities for bringing private 
enforcement to tax law as a way of adding risk of detection and 
prosecution to the compliance calculus, and aligning taxpayers on the side 
of tax collection rather than tax avoidance.  Part IV takes the contingent 
nature of tax as given, but rejects the usual conclusion that legal 
uncertainty justifies nearly any transaction.  Instead, it posits a stricter 
rather than more lax level of certainty that practitioners and taxpayers must 
reach before reporting tax positions.  It also recommends broader 
disclosure rules, both to assist the government in cracking down on 
overaggressive behavior and to provide taxpayers a procedure to assert 
aggressive positions.  A combination of heightened practice standards and 
disclosure rules can alter compliance norms by adding yet another element 
of risk to the taxpayer’s evaluation of whether and how to comply with the 
law.  
                                                                                                                          
117 Shaviro, supra note 115, at 45.  
118 See Kyle D. Logue, Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Insurance, 25 VA. TAX REV. 
339, 387–95 (2005) (describing a new type of tax risk insurance policy, sometimes called tax indemnity 
insurance or transactional tax risk insurance, that provides coverage against the IRS disallowing a 
taxpayer-insured’s treatment of a particular transaction).  
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III. IMPROVING ENFORCEMENT, IMPROVING SERVICE 
Improving enforcement alongside service requires balancing 
regulatory sticks and carrots.  It entails enhancing the government’s ability 
to enforce the nation’s tax laws through increased resources and relevant 
taxpayer information.  In some respects, improving enforcement requires 
making the government a better adversary.  But creating a better adversary 
in the context of cooperative tax regulation appreciates that effective 
enforcement embraces transparency.  In this way, enforcement spills over 
into service, with the government creating a regulatory culture that seeks to 
understand and inculcate the interests of taxpayers.  Traditional regulatory 
models emphasizing post-filing controversy give way to pre-filing 
information sharing and issue resolution.  The collaborative exchange, in 
turn, yields greater certainty of outcome for taxpayers and greater certainty 
of behavior for tax regulators.  Moreover, it mitigates the mutual suspicion 
that currently separates taxpayers and tax regulators, and that contributes to 
flagging compliance.  The IRS has begun to recognize the benefits of the 
cooperative approach, “establishing an environment where collaboration is 
priority one,”119 and “reducing noncompliance while ensuring fairness, 
observing taxpayer rights, and reducing the burden on taxpayers who 
comply.”120  Part III of the Article provides specific recommendations to 
further mobilize a cooperative regulatory environment, and to equip the 
government with the necessary tools to work collaboratively with 
taxpayers. 
A.  Closing the Resource and Information Gaps 
In 1998, the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act121 prompted a radical 
reshuffling of resources and a shift from enforcement to customer service 
that was arguably long overdue.  Congress recognized that taxpayer 
perceptions of the system’s procedural fairness played an integral role in 
tax compliance.  But politicians overreacted.  The IRS “may have made 
mistakes,” former IRS Commissioner Mortimer Caplin has said of the 
1998 reforms, “but they were not malicious or systemic.”122  The 
crackdown on the IRS forced the agency to cut employees, reduce the 
number and thoroughness of audits, and slash enforcement appropriations 
all in the name of customer service. 
                                                                                                                          
119 Drew Douglas, IRS to Focus on Service, Enforcement, Technology to Close Tax Gap, Officials 
Say, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-1 (Oct. 23, 2007) (quoting Linda Stiff, acting Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue).  
120 Reducing the Federal Tax Gap, supra note 8, at 57.  
121 Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 
Stat. 685 (1998).  
122 Mortimer M. Caplin, The Tax Lawyer’s Role in the Way the American Tax System Works, 106 
TAX NOTES 697, 699 (2005).  
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In recent years, the IRS has begun to recalibrate the scales.  IRS Chief 
Counsel Donald Korb has said that while the pendulum swung “way too 
far” in the direction of service in the 1990s, it is swinging back toward 
enforcement as the IRS attempts “to get to equilibrium.”123  Former 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue Mark Everson echoed Korb’s remarks, 
noting that a “rebalance has been struck between service and enforcement” 
but not at the expense of service, which, according to Everson, has also 
improved.124  
A renewed focus on enforcement appears to have paid dividends.  
Between 2002 and 2007, enforcement revenues rose an astounding 73%, 
from $34.1 billion to $59.2 billion.125  Moreover, between 2000 and 2007, 
the audit rate for individual taxpayers jumped from an all-time low of 
0.49% to a more respectable 1.03%,126 while for high-income individuals 
(defined as persons earning more than $100,000), the audit rate steadily 
increased between 2001 and 2005, with tax year 2005 boasting the highest 
number of reviews since 1995.127  Furthermore, in 2007, the government 
audited a full 7% more total individual taxpayers (1.3 million versus 1.2 
million), including an amazing 84% increase for taxpayers earning more 
than $1 million.128  
These numbers are misleading, however.  While absolute dollar 
amounts from enforcement have increased, the IRS has left a significant 
amount of money on the table.  The Service audited 45% fewer total 
companies between 1998 and 2007.129  For every category of business 
taxpayer—small business, large corporation, and tax-exempt—the IRS 
performed fewer audits in 2006 than in 1997.130  Moreover, although 
collections in 2007 increased 22% over the previous year, both the number 
of delinquent taxpayers (866,777) and the amount owed on unassigned 
collection cases ($34.9 billion) hit 10-year highs.131  In addition, the IRS 
has begun allocating fewer hours to each audit,132 relying increasingly on 
                                                                                                                          
123 Alison Bennett, Korb Defends Aggressive Shelter Approach; Vows to Help Efforts to Reach 
“Equilibrium,” DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-1 (Oct. 13, 2006). 
124 William H. Carlile, Tax Compliance Environment Improved, IRS Commissioner Tells TEI 
Conference, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-1 (Oct. 24, 2006). 
125 IRS, IRS Statement on Fiscal Year 2007 Enforcement, with Statistics, Enforcement Revenue 
Chart, TAXCORE (BNA) No. 12 (Jan. 18, 2008) [hereinafter IRS Statement on FY 2007 Enforcement].  
126 TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, REFERENCE NO. 2008-30-095, 
TRENDS IN COMPLIANCE ACTIVITIES THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 45 (2008) [hereinafter TIGTA], 
http://www.treas.gov/tigta/auditreports/2008reports/200830095fr.pdf. 
127 IRS News Release, supra note 1.  
128 IRS Statement on FY 2007 Enforcement, supra note 125.  
129 TIGTA, supra note 126, at 9.  
130 Stephen Joyce, IRS to Continue Tax Compliance Push; Effect on Audits, Planning Uncertain, 
DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at S-11 (Jan. 16, 2007). 
131 TIGTA, supra note 126, at 5.  
132 See Alison Bennett, TRAC Asserts ‘Historic Collapse in Audits’; Shott Says Interpretation of 
Data Is Wrong, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-10 (Apr. 15, 2008); Stephen Joyce, TRAC Says IRS 
Spends Less Time on Audits: IRS Says Worker Gains Mean More Revenue, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), at 
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“correspondence” audits (i.e., mail audits), which are less effective than in-
person audits at detecting underreporting by high-income taxpayers.133  
Revenue agents also spent 40% more time in 2006 than in 2001 conducting 
“no-change audits” that resulted in no additional tax assessment 
recommendations.134  There have even been reports that the Service has 
pressured agents to prematurely close audits of large corporations as part 
of negotiated compromises.135 
The audit rate itself belies improved enforcement.  In 2007, the IRS 
audited only slightly more than 1% of all individual returns,136 a marked 
improvement in the short term,137 but far below historical averages.  Even 
then, the IRS could not verify all positions embedded in examined 
returns.138  The other 99% of the time, the opposing party’s assertions went 
unexamined and unchallenged.  The IRS may have even less luck 
enforcing the tax laws on businesses, despite higher absolute audit rates.  
In 2007, exams of companies with assets exceeding $10 million decreased 
to 16.8%,139 while audits of companies with assets of more than $250 
million dropped to roughly 30%.140  Even for corporations subject to 
annual audit, there is no guarantee the Service will identify questionable 
transactions, either because of gaps in the corporate taxpayer’s records,141 
concealment of impermissible transactions,142 or the practice of allowing 
corporations to set the audit agenda and include for examination 
conservative transactions while obscuring or omitting aggressive 
transactions.143  
Viewed historically, the modern Internal Revenue Service is a shadow 
                                                                                                                          
G-8 (Dec. 21, 2006) (reporting twenty percent decline in cycle time spent on large corporate audits 
between 2002 and 2006).  
133 Allen Kenney, TIGTA Finds Audit-by-Mail More Common Than IRS Says, 115 TAX NOTES 
TODAY 219 (2007); see also TIGTA, supra note 126, at 8 (reporting that almost 83% of all 
examinations of individual taxpayers in 2007 were correspondence examinations).  
134 Stephen Joyce, TRAC Says IRS Time on No-Change Audits Up; IRS Defends Practices, Cites 
Improvement, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), at G-7 (Apr. 13, 2007). 
135 David Cay Johnston, Agents Say Fast Audits Hurt I.R.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2007, at C1, 
available at Lexis, News Library, NYT File.  
136 TIGTA, supra note 126, at 45.  
137 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.  
138 See Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Psychology of Taxes: Why They Drive Us Crazy, and How We 
Can Make Them Sane, 16 VA. TAX REV. 155, 189 (1996) (writing that even if the IRS audits a 
taxpayer, “it may not notice whatever tax evasion the taxpayer may have engaged in”). 
139 TIGTA, supra note 126, at 45.  
140 Id. at 9.  According to some observers, the audit rate for these companies may be even lower. 
See Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), Audits of Largest Corporations Slide to All 
Time Low (2008), available at http://trac.syr.edu/tracirs/newfindings/current/ (citing a twenty-six 
percent audit rate).   
141 See Rosenberg, supra note 138, at 189.  
142 See Graeme S. Cooper, Analyzing Corporate Tax Evasion, 50 TAX L. REV. 33, 100 (1994) 
(finding that businesses conceal tax-motivated transactions from auditors).  
143 See 1 JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, STUDY OF PRESENT LAW PENALTY AND INTEREST 
PROVISIONS, AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 3801 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE RESTRUCTURING 
AND REFORM ACT OF 1998, at 223 (1999). 
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of its former self.  During the “golden age” of the IRS in the 1960s, audit 
levels approached an astonishing 6%.144  The Service recruited young 
lawyers from top law schools, entry-level salaries for government lawyers 
competed with private-sector wages, and IRS employees garnered respect 
from taxpayers, practitioners, and politicians.  In every category, the 
golden years are a distant memory.  Audit levels have fallen to 1%; newly-
minted Harvard law graduates choose Wall Street firms with $160,000 
starting salaries and $30,000 bonuses over positions at the IRS for one-
fourth to one-third the remuneration; and the status attributed to working 
for the IRS has yet to recover from the “disasters” of the late 1990s.145  It is 
fair to say that the modern IRS strikes fear only in the hearts of the meek. 
Compared to its main competitor, the private tax bar, the Service is 
short money, personnel, and expertise.146  The first two deficiencies go 
hand in hand.  Between 1998 and 2007, funding for IRS personnel fell 
dramatically, resulting in a 23% decline in combined collection and 
examination function enforcement staff.147  Moreover, between 1996 and 
2003, the number of revenue officers and revenue agents—two groups 
critical to detecting noncompliance—declined by 40% and 50%, 
respectively.148  Overall, the IRS workforce shrunk by nearly 15,000 
employees from 2002 to 2008.149  Meanwhile, IRS workload jumped 
sharply.  The number of taxpayers filing returns grew from 123 million in 
1998 to 138 million in 2007, with more complicated returns—such as 
Schedule C returns—doubling the growth rate of aggregate individual 
returns.150  
Shortfalls in expertise are harder to quantify.  But discussions with 
leading tax practitioners suggest that this component of the “resource gap” 
is an even larger problem than personnel and funding issues.151  One 
                                                                                                                          
144 A sizeable though unquantifiable portion of the declining audit rate is attributable to the 
computerization of tax administration, with computer matching performing much of what audits 
accomplished in the 1960s.  This Article does not endorse raising audit rates to reflect historically high 
levels, and it recognizes that we cannot “audit our way out of the tax gap” to achieve optimal 
compliance. Alison Bennett, Solomon Previews Major Guidance, Outlines Concerns on Tax Gap, 
Economic Substance, 47 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) at G-11 (Mar. 12, 2007) (quoting Assistant Treasury 
Secretary for Tax Policy Eric Solomon).  However, it strongly recommends forging a new audit 
strategy that includes higher rates of audit as a form of deterrence.   
145 Joyce, supra note 130, at 2 (quoting former IRS Commissioner Donald Alexander’s reference 
to the backlash against the IRS after the 1997 and 1998 Senate hearings, in which witnesses testified—
largely falsely—to abusive enforcement actions by the IRS).  
146 David Schizer has drawn a similar conclusion: “In important respects, the private tax bar 
outmatches their counterparts in government.  This imbalance is one of sheer numbers, of access to 
information, and, at least in some cases, of sophistication and expertise.”  Schizer, supra note 56, at 
331.  
147 TIGTA, supra note 126, at 2. 
148 Diane Freda, NTEU President Kelley Tells Congress More Workers Key to Reducing Tax Gap, 
53 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-6 (Mar. 20, 2007).  
149  IRS Oversight Board Annual Report 2007, at 9 (2008). 
150  Id. 
151 These discussions involved practitioners in the Los Angeles, New York, and Washington, DC 
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seasoned tax lawyer reported that in one of the biggest partnership tax 
cases of the last twenty years, the investigating revenue agent suspended 
the audit for several weeks toward the end of the inquiry to attend an entry-
level partnership class.  In another partnership investigation, a private-
sector lawyer spent several hours trying to explain to the investigating 
agents that, as the agents did understand, reduction of debt inside a 
partnership is treated as a cash distribution152 (which had not been reported 
as income by the partners), but there was the offsetting fact that the debt 
also increased outside basis when it was first assumed by the partnership, 
so the distribution was not in excess of basis after all.153  The agents 
relented on this key fact and closed the case, but only after months of 
resource-intensive investigation.  In addition, some practitioners report that 
40 to 50% of issues on tax returns get picked up by revenue agents today, 
whereas of old that figure was 70 to 90%.  Professor John Braithwaite has 
reported a similarly dismal assessment of revenue agent competence 
among elite tax lawyers.  It is “not hard to get things by them,” one of 
Braithwaite’s interviewee’s shared, while another opined, “[t]he real issue 
is that the IRS aren’t [sic] smart enough to find these [sophisticated tax 
shelter] deals on a tax return.”154  
The IRS has implemented aggressive measures to reduce the resource 
gap.  Chief Counsel Donald Korb’s initiatives have been particularly 
laudable.  Korb has launched an aggressive campaign, for instance, to 
return “a healthy respect for the IRS” by recruiting top legal talent to the 
Service.155  To this end, Korb and his deputies have begun aggressively 
recruiting at the country’s top law schools.  The campaign, dubbed “Great 
Place to Start” and depicted in a glossy brochure containing biographies of 
tax luminaries whose legal careers began at the IRS, has been wildly 
successful, with thousands of aspiring tax lawyers vying for entry-level 
jobs.156  
While recruiting, training, and retaining a top-notch workforce are 
necessary components for closing the resource gap, they are not sufficient. 
More drastic measures need to be considered by policymakers and tax 
officials, including those offered by Dean David Schizer of Columbia Law 
                                                                                                                          
legal markets.  
152 I.R.C. § 752(b) (2008).  
153 Id. § 752(a).  
154 JOHN BRAITHWAITE, MARKETS IN VICE: MARKETS IN VIRTUE 133 (2005).  
155 Bennett, supra note 123. 
156 As testament to the campaign’s success, the Chief Counsel’s Office received over 3000 
applications from law students in both 2006 and 2007 and interviewed at more than 150 law schools in 
both years, compared to 60 schools in 2005.  Telephone Interview with Hsinyu Yu, Attorney 
Recruitment Manager, IRS Chief Counsel Office (Jan. 30, 2008); see also Robert Guy Matthews, It’s 
Taxing to Recruit Top Law Grads to IRS, but a New Push Betters Returns, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2006, 
at B1, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File; Sheryl Stratton, After One Year on the Job, IRS 
Chief Counsel Reviews, Previews, 107 TNT 292 (Apr. 13, 2005).  For the brochure, see 
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/files/publication_4063.pdf.  
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School.  With respect to increasing government expertise as part of the 
effort to combat overaggressive tax planning, Schizer proposes recruiting 
retiring tax partners to mentor recent law school graduates entering 
government work,157 adopting a generous loan forgiveness program for 
these graduates,158 increasing the government pay scale to attract a small, 
elite team of private sector lawyers,159 retaining the equivalent of a Delta 
Force of tax academics and highly skilled practitioners for discrete, 
specialized projects and litigation,160 and encouraging bar associations to 
participate and assist in law reform.161 
Even with the smartest, best educated, highest paid personnel, the IRS 
would still be at a disadvantage.  Staffing and retention are problems for 
the Service, but skill level is not the primary issue.  Indeed, in many 
respects, the “information gap” separating tax regulators from private 
sector tax lawyers is significantly wider than the resource gap.  IRS 
enforcement is so severely handicapped by informational asymmetries that 
taxpayers can engage in abusive tax planning, accurately report 
transactions associated with that planning, yet still provide the IRS no 
indication of abusive activity.  
Take the intermediary transaction tax shelter as an example.162  These 
transactions typically involve four parties: a seller (S) who wants to sell the 
stock of a target corporation (T); a promoter-controlled intermediary entity 
(E); and a buyer (B) who wants to purchase the assets but not the stock of 
the target.  Under the terms of a pre-arranged plan, S purports to sell the 
stock of T to E.  E has arranged financing for the sale through a bridge 
loan, which is secured by the assets of T.  At the same time or shortly after 
the stock sale, E purports to sell T’s assets to B.  The bridge loan is repaid 
from the proceeds, while any excess proceeds are retained by E as a fee for 
serving as the accommodation party.  As a result of the transaction, S 
recognizes reduced gain due to its high basis in the stock of T; B receives 
larger depreciation and amortization deductions based on the fair market 
value of the assets (i.e., B’s purchase price rather than T’s basis in the 
assets); and E avoids paying tax on the gain from the asset sale by 
offsetting the gain with losses from the sale of inflated-basis assets. 
                                                                                                                          
157 Schizer, supra note 56, at 347.  
158 Id.  
159 Id. at 347–48. 
160 Id. at 348–49, 351–52.  
161 Id. at 350–51.  
162 See IRS Notice 2001-16, 2001-9 I.R.B. 730; IRS Notice 2008-20, 2008-6 I.R.B. 406.  I am 
grateful to William Alexander for this example.  The IRS has identified this scheme as a “listed 
transaction,” defined  as a “reportable transaction” which “is the same as, or substantially similar to, a 
transaction specifically identified by the Secretary as a tax avoidance transaction.”  I.R.C. § 
6707A(c)(2) (Supp. 2000).  To date, the IRS has identified thirty-two such transactions.  See Listed 
Abusive Tax Shelters and Transactions, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/ 
0,,id=120633,00.html (listing abusive tax shelters and transactions). 
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As far as the IRS is concerned, S’s tax return reflects a simple sale, 
while B’s reflects a straight asset purchase.  The only way for the Service 
to expose the scheme is to examine together the returns of all four parties.  
In these transactions, paying more money to private sector attorneys and 
expert academics or recruiting law students with higher grades or more 
elite degrees will not uncover the tax shelter activity.  In either case, the 
IRS misses the abusive behavior because there is no indication that 
anything is wrong.  In these situations, information rather than resources 
separates the government from the private sector.  Ultimately, heightened 
disclosure requirements and more stringent standards of tax practice, 
subjects discussed in Part IV of this Article, offer a better solution to the 
problem of information asymmetries.  
B.  Extending the Private Enforcement Model to Tax 
Even if public enforcement were stepped up by enhancing government 
resources, private innovation would outstrip it due to information 
asymmetries.  These asymmetries are difficult to overcome because 
taxpayers and their advisors perceive substantial benefits to obscuring tax 
shelter activity.  Moreover, these benefits far exceed the discounted 
probability of detection, prosecution, and punishment.  Thus, to the extent 
the government turns to the private sector for help in improving 
compliance, it needs to provide incentives to balance the significant 
economic upside of abusive tax planning.  This section of the Article 
discusses various incentives that flow from extending private enforcement 
to tax regulation.  While this recommendation may appear to be susceptible 
to charges that it abdicates the essential governmental function of revenue 
collection, scholars have shown that private enforcement of public law can 
be a powerful monitoring and prosecutorial mechanism.163  Private 
enforcement is particularly appropriate when regulators—due to 
asymmetric information, active concealment by regulated parties, and 
weak enforcement—are unable or unwilling to enforce the law or 
prosecute offenders effectively.  Current tax regulation suffers from all 
three symptoms, and could benefit significantly from private enforcement 
efforts. 
In 2006, Congress explicitly recognized the benefits associated with 
private tax enforcement.  It amended the little known tax whistleblower 
statute, Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”) section 7623, by significantly 
                                                                                                                          
163 See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, Private Monitoring and Antitrust Enforcement: Paying 
Informants to Reveal Cartels, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 766 (2001) [hereinafter Kovacic, Private 
Monitoring]; William E. Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits as Monitoring Devices in 
Government Contracting, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1799 (1996); Joshua D. Rosenberg, Narrowing the Tax 
Gap: Behavioral Options, 117 TAX NOTES 517 (2007); Rosenberg, supra note 138, at 205–08; Dennis 
J. Ventry, Jr., Whistleblowers and Qui Tam for Tax, 61 TAX LAW. 357 (2008).  
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expanding the size of rewards paid to informants.  The promise of lucrative 
bounties increased incentives for private persons to expose abusive 
taxpayer behavior, and added risk of detection and prosecution to the 
compliance calculus.164  In addition, the 2006 amendments authorized a 
new IRS Whistleblower Office165 to process tips received from informants 
who “spot tax problems in their workplace, while conducting day-to-day 
personal business, or anywhere else they may be encountered.”166  While 
prior law capped informant awards at $2,000,000 (and at $50,000 as late as 
1989167), the revamped law contains no such cap and authorizes awards 
between 15 and 30% of collected proceeds, including penalties, interest, 
additions to tax, and any other amounts resulting from the action.168  The 
IRS launched the Whistleblower Office in February 2007, and named 
Stephen Whitlock, former head of the IRS Office of Professional 
Responsibility, as its first Director.169  Early indications are that the 
revamped program is working as planned, with “knowledgeable insiders” 
submitting bounty claims and turning over “big, fat piles of paper” 
involving hundreds of millions of dollars.170  In October 2007, the 
Whistleblower Office received its first $1 billion submission,171 followed 
by a $2 billion submission two months later,172 and a $4.4 billion 
submission in June 2008.173  At 30% of collected proceeds, that equals 
potential informant awards of $300 million, $600 million, and $1.32 
billion. 
Congress could further embrace the private enforcement approach by 
(i) enacting a private attorney general statute for tax, and (ii) authorizing 
private citizens to bring qui tam lawsuits for purported tax violations.174  
Under a private attorney general statute for tax, private individuals would 
be authorized to make claims against other private parties for failure to pay 
                                                                                                                          
164 Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 406(a)(1), 120 Stat. 2958 
(2006). 
165 Id. § 406(b).  
166 IRS News Release IR-2007-25 (Feb. 2, 2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/ 
article/0,,id=167542,00.html. 
167 IRS Publication 733 (rev. 7-80).  Congress raised the cap in 1990 to $100,000.  IRS 
Publication 733 (rev. 11-90).  
168 I.R.C. § 7623(b)(1) (2006). 
169 Dustin Stamper, Whitlock Tapped to Head New IRS Whistle-Blower Office, 114 TAX NOTES 
628 (2007).  
170 Tom Herman, Whistleblower Law Scores Early Success, Higher Rewards Attract Informants 
Submitting Tips, WALL ST. J., May 16, 2007, at D3, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File 
(quoting Director Whitlock). 
171 J.P. Finet, Tax Whistleblower Action Claims $1 Billion Underpayment by Fortune 500 
Company, 197 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-5 (Oct. 12, 2007). 
172 J.P. Finet, Whistleblower Action Claims Major Firm Underpaid Its U.S. Taxes by $2 Billion, 
238 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-9 (Dec. 12, 2007).  
173 Tax Whistleblower Claims $4.4 Billion Tax Underpayment by Fortune 500 Company, 115 
DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-4 (June 16, 2008).  
174 “Qui tam” is shorthand for “qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipse” or “he who sues for 
the king as for himself.” 
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taxes.  As with other such statutes,175 the idea would be to provide 
incentives for private persons to bring lawsuits deemed to be in the public 
interest (in this case, collection of taxes owed but not paid) and for private 
sector lawyers to represent those plaintiffs.  With respect to extending the 
qui tam approach to tax, other federal and state whistleblower statutes, 
including the wildly successful False Claims Act,176 already provide for qui 
tam actions,177 which allow private individuals with knowledge of fraud 
committed against the government to bring suit on the government’s 
behalf.  The informant presents the government with her information, and 
the government decides whether to prosecute the case or allow the 
informant to proceed alone as a qui tam plaintiff.  Bringing the qui tam 
model to tax would add additional risk associated with noncompliant 
behavior.  The threat of qui tam lawsuits could alter governance and 
compliance norms within organizations, and deter noncompliant behavior 
at the source.  Moreover, the qui tam approach provides a particularly 
efficient form of regulation by shifting the cost of compliance to the party 
or parties with the lower cost of monitoring, i.e., employee insiders, in-
house lawyers, and outside tax counsel.178 
Private enforcement of tax laws could also shrink the resource and 
information gaps by aligning the interests of taxpayers, tax practitioners, 
and tax regulators.  Economic incentives for exposing abusive taxpayer 
behavior would put taxpayers and tax advisors on the side of enforcement 
and collection.  Private enforcement programs could create a market for 
practitioners skilled in shepherding whistleblower and qui tam plaintiffs 
through the regulatory and judicial processes.  Lured by the prospect of 
economic gain, these practitioners and their clients would effectively act as 
government deputies in protecting the revenue and rooting out abusive tax 
avoidance.  In fact, in the short time since Congress enacted sweeping 
changes to the tax informant statute, the tax whistleblower bar has grown 
perceptibly, as much as 15–20% according to the national organization of 
                                                                                                                          
175 Examples of private attorney general statutes include the Toxic Substances Control Act of 
1976 § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (2006), the Clean Water Act of 1972 § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000), and 
the Clean Air Act of 1970 § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2000). 
176 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2000).  In 2007, recoveries under the False Claims Act exceeded $1.4 
billion.  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DIVISION, FRAUD STATISTICS OVERVIEW, http://www. 
lopds.com/files/pdf/stats.fy2007.final.pdf. 
177 As of September 1, 2008, seventeen states and the District of Columbia had enacted false 
claims statutes containing qui tam provisions.  Five additional states had qui tam laws that applied 
exclusively to heath care fraud, while two municipalities, Chicago and New York City, had enacted 
false claims ordinances with qui tam enforcement mechanisms.  See Taxpayers Against Fraud 
Education Fund, The False Claims Act Legal Center, State False Claims Acts, 
http://www.taf.org/statefca.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2008). 
178 See Kovacic, Private Monitoring, supra note 163, at 774 (“The chief virtue of private 
monitoring is that it gives monitoring tasks to individuals closest to the relevant information.”).  For a 
fuller treatment of the tax whistleblower statute and the implications of extending qui tam to tax, see 
Ventry, supra note 163. 
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qui tam lawyers.179 
The private enforcement approach reflects an agile compliance strategy 
that could help the government keep up with “the capacities of 
professionals advising the private sector for evasive innovation.”180  Recent 
legislative enactments, particularly the anti-shelter provisions of the Jobs 
Act, arm tax officials with improved anti-shelter weapons.  But they attack 
known transactions, while unidentified deals remain hidden.  “Narrowly-
tailored legislative responses to particular types of shelters are . . . not 
adequate as a solution to the overall shelter problem,” professors Marvin 
Chirelstein and Larry Zelenak have written, because legislative fixes “are 
prospective only,” and taxpayers “merely move on to new types of shelters 
not yet legislated against.”181  Statutory solutions should aim to uproot 
abusive activity rather than attack it post hoc.  Tax authorities need a 
compliance regime that will detect, deter, and effectively punish 
noncompliant behavior while rewarding compliant behavior.  Extending 
the private enforcement model to tax and, as discussed in the next section, 
increasing information sharing among taxpayers, tax advisors, and tax 
officials, are essential components of such a regime. 
C.  Diffusing Suspicion and Creating Dialogue 
At the same time we improve enforcement and align taxpayer and 
government interests, we must alter IRS culture.182  The failure of the 
prevailing tax compliance regime is as much attributable to deficient 
compliance and enforcement norms among tax regulators as among 
taxpayers and their advisors.  Over the years, tax regulators have cultivated 
an “Us vs. Them” mentality, whereby officials resist sharing information 
with taxpayers whom they view (sometimes correctly) as resistant to 
sharing information with them.  The result is that each side is deeply 
suspicious of the other, with concerns over process exacerbating the 
suspicion.  Taxpayers complain about unresponsive administrative 
procedures associated with published guidance, taxpayer-specific issue 
resolution, and deficiency examinations.  To their clients’ concerns, tax 
advisors add complaints that disciplinary investigations of tax practitioners 
conducted by the Treasury Department resemble Star Chamber 
                                                                                                                          
179 Telephone Interview with Jeb White, Editor, Quarterly Review, Taxpayers Against Fraud 
(TAF) (July 3, 2007).   
180 Simon, After Confidentiality, supra note 32, at 1460. 
181 Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the Search for a Silver Bullet, 
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1939, 1939 (2005). 
182 Altering organizational culture is no easy task, particularly within organizations with 
entrenched institutional practices such as the IRS.  For a case study on changing organizational culture 
within revenue agencies, see Jenny Job et al., Culture Change in Three Taxation Administrations: 
From Command-and-Control to Responsive Regulation, 29 L. & POL’Y 84 (2007) (describing efforts to 
change revenue-collecting cultures in Australia, New Zealand, and Timor Leste). 
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proceedings with no procedural safeguards.  Meanwhile, tax regulators are 
convinced that taxpayers and their advisors thwart reporting procedures by 
engaging in and failing to disclose abusive transactions.  Thus, many of the 
recommendations already discussed in this Article, such as rewarding 
taxpayer compliance, encouraging participatory rulemaking, and enhancing 
private enforcement, are designed to align the interests of tax regulators, 
taxpayers, and tax advisors.  Improving perceptions of procedural justice 
among taxpayers and advisors can be especially effective in facilitating 
compliance with tax laws.183 
Sharing information could go a long way toward mitigating suspicious 
minds, but only if the information flows in two directions, with taxpayers 
and tax officials both realizing benefits from the exchange.  Mutually 
beneficial communication would provide regulators with additional 
information to assess levels of compliance and to focus resources.  It 
would also provide taxpayers certainty and assistance in complying with 
the law.  Given that tax risk has become an increasingly salient factor in 
board rooms,184 taxpayers are seeking more from tax regulators to assist 
with compliance.  According to Dave Hartnett, Director General of the 
United Kingdom’s tax agency, “tax is creeping into corporate 
responsibility and into the sort of thing that business leaders as opposed to 
tax leaders are starting to say about tax, tax risk[,] and the support they 
want from tax administrat[ors].”185  Business taxpayers can no longer 
afford to treat tax as an unknown quantity.  They desire more certainty in 
outcome, even if that means sharing more information with tax officials.  
Meanwhile, tax authorities are starting to appreciate that disclosure and 
information sharing offer mutual benefits: “We want compliance with the 
                                                                                                                          
183 See Valerie Braithwaite, Tax System Integrity and Compliance: The Democratic Management 
of the Tax System, in TAXING DEMOCRACY, supra note 28, at 271, 287 (explaining that a taxing agency 
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184 See infra notes 331–33 and accompanying text. 
185 Weinberger et al., supra note 79, at 35 (remarks of Dave Hartnett).  
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tax laws,” an IRS official recently told a roomful of practitioners.186  “You 
need a level of certainty, so do we.”187 
Reciprocal information sharing can produce mutual benefits even 
when opposing parties disclose otherwise proprietary information.  At the 
annual Tax Council Policy Institute (TCPI) symposium in 2007, British tax 
officials discussed their experience with comparing risk assessments of 
aggressive tax positions prepared by taxpayers with those prepared by the 
government.  The comparison revealed that each side shared similar 
assessments of each other’s litigating positions, a realization that generated 
trust and respect.188  During a later panel at the same symposium, 
moderator and tax lawyer Armando Gomez engaged IRS Chief Counsel 
Donald Korb on the issue of reciprocal information sharing and on viewing 
risk assessments as “a useful tool for getting both sides closer to an 
agreement on what the right outcome is.”189  Korb dismissed the idea as 
“just silly,” and suggested that information sharing should be a one-way 
street with taxpayers disclosing information and the government receiving 
it.190 
While Korb has done a great deal during his tenure to facilitate 
communication between taxpayers and the government, his position at the 
TCPI conference undermines the principles of cooperative tax regulation.  
If tax authorities expect taxpayers and tax advisors to adopt a more 
transparent approach to tax compliance, they have to play by the same set 
of rules and be willing to alter their own compliance norms.  In the words 
of Director General Hartnett, tax administrators have to “pause 
occasionally and say to ourselves, am I too close to the immediate issues 
and is there a bigger goal here and something bigger I can achieve if I start 
approaching tax in a different way?”191  The “mantra” for tax officials, 
therefore, should be “transparency, disclosure, and cooperation” flowing in 
both directions.192  One-way information flows, from taxpayer to tax 
official, only exacerbate suspicion, distrust, and noncompliance.  
Suspicion and distrust also currently surround the appeals process.  
Tax practitioners have long questioned whether they really get a “fresh 
look” when the IRS Office of Appeals examines a challenged position.  
For their part, tax officials insist that appeals remain independent of agency 
policy or published guidance.  But recent actions by IRS officials belie the 
                                                                                                                          
186 Richard R. Jones et al., Tax Disclosures in Financial Statements: The FASB, SEC and IRS 
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purported independence, indicating that while Appeals is committed to an 
independent review of each and every tax question, it is also beginning to 
conform more closely to official IRS interpretations of the law.193  
Practitioners rightly wonder, “How can Appeals remain independent and 
‘get with the program’ at the same time?”194  In fact, why even have an 
appeals process if it merely restates the official views of the Chief 
Counsel’s office or of published guidance?  Of course, appeals officers 
cannot adopt positions on statutory interpretation contrary to official IRS 
policy, but that does not prevent them from acknowledging contrary 
authority or distinguishing the taxpayer’s case from previous 
interpretations.  If the IRS is serious about the perception and application 
of procedural fairness, it needs to embrace the idea of an independent 
Appeals Office.195  
To break down still further its adversarial image, the IRS could involve 
taxpayers and their advisors more directly in regulatory processes.  This 
effort should involve tax officials sitting down with taxpayers and their 
advisors to discuss and resolve tax positions before the taxpayer files a 
return.  The IRS has rolled out several pre-filing initiatives, including the 
Advance Pricing Agreement (APA) program, the Industry Issue Resolution 
(IIR) program, the Pre-Filing Agreement (PFA) program, and the 
Compliance Assurance Process (CAP).196  In the event taxpayers find 
                                                                                                                          
193 See Dustin Stamper, Appeals Needs to Be “On Same Page” as Rest of IRS, Brown Says, 2007 
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themselves subject to examination by the IRS, the Fast Track Settlement 
(FTS) program offers a streamlined dispute resolution process.197  
Together, the pre-filing and dispute resolution programs offer taxpayers 
and advisors the opportunity to participate directly in the resolution of tax 
issues.  Moreover, they provide taxpayers and the government increased 
certainty of outcome as well as lower costs.198  Timely, reliable, and 
participatory guidance enlists taxpayers and their advisors in tax 
enforcement, and discourages impermissible planning activity by offering 
tangible incentives for choosing compliance over avoidance. 
An open dialogue between taxpayers, practitioners, and tax authorities 
is crucial to forging a shared understanding of what it means to comply 
with the law.  Absent such dialogue, the parties “may have different and 
genuinely held understandings of a rule’s meaning, and may each consider 
theirs the correct and clear meaning.”199  Moreover, as Valerie Braithwaite 
has observed, whether or not a taxpayer “does what is asked of him or her 
is not always visible.  Furthermore, whether or not a person interprets the 
request in accordance with its intent is sometimes far from certain.”200  
Active communication between the parties can identify a shared 
compliance norm, and clarify what is expected of each participant.  
One particularly effective way to facilitate communication between 
taxpayers, advisors, and regulators is to involve all parties in the 
rulemaking process.  In fact, in early 2007, the IRS launched a program to 
solicit public comments earlier in the guidance process.201  Though 
politicians initially criticized the program as giving private industry too 
much influence over regulatory functions,202 Chief Counsel Korb reported 
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in late 2007 that the process had “worked beautifully,” thereby quieting 
concerns on Capitol Hill.203  The initiative allows the government to “meet 
the demands of the taxpaying public for more technical guidance” when 
constrained by “a finite amount of resources,”204 while also opening to the 
light of day a previously insulated process.  Affected taxpayers, bar 
associations, and trade groups routinely comment on published notices of 
proposed rulemaking, and many of these groups meet privately with 
Treasury officials on matters important to their constituents.205  
Recognizing that interest group lobbying had become an entrenched aspect 
of public lawmaking, and that business knowledge and experience, 
particularly in the tax field, are critical for government officials, the IRS 
added transparency to a process otherwise hidden from public view.  
Soliciting comments earlier creates a collaborative, participatory, and 
informed system.  In addition to facilitating communication, the program 
helps regulators overcome distrust and suspicion by working alongside 
taxpayers, incorporating their concerns into legal rules, and investing them 
professionally and personally in compliance.  
At their heart, policies that facilitate participatory rulemaking, 
information sharing, and pre-filing resolution challenge the historically 
adversarial tax regulatory environment.  As we will see in Part IV, the tax 
professional associations—particularly the American Bar Association 
(ABA) and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA)—have contributed mightily to this adversarial atmosphere.  The 
ABA’s official ethical guidelines pertaining to tax practice characterize the 
IRS as an “adversary party rather than a judicial tribunal” or even a “quasi-
judicial institution.”206  They further assume that the act of filing a tax 
return (an act that the taxpayer controls and that merely reports the 
taxpayer’s financial transactions for the year) will result in a 
controversy.207  Even ABA guidelines pertaining to marketed tax 
shelters—guidelines that were designed explicitly to encourage lawyers to 
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“skew the IRS’s view,” particularly if special interests wrote the first draft of guidance upon which all 
subsequent drafts depended.  Diane Freda, Top Senate Finance Panel Members Assail IRS Plan to Let 
Outsiders Develop Guidance, 51 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-6 (Mar. 16, 2007). 
203 Dustin Stamper, Korb Laments Penalty Pileup, Vows More Practitioner-Driven Guidance, 117 
TAX NOTES 421, 421 (Oct. 29, 2007).   
204 Stephen Joyce, Korb Defends Proposed Guidance Process as Transparent Method of Aiding 
Taxpayers, 47 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-1 (Mar. 12, 2007).  
205 Stamper, supra note 203, at 421 (quoting Korb as saying, “Let’s not kid ourselves, this has 
been going on forever where people come in and give us proposed ideas—often in secret”).   
206 ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 314 (1965). 
207 ABA Formal Opinion 85-352 warns, without explanation, that “in many cases a lawyer must 
realistically anticipate that the filing of a tax return may be the first step in a process that may result in 
an adversarial relationship between the client and the IRS.”  ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 
85-352 (1985) [hereinafter Formal Op. 85-352].  
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cooperate in the crackdown on abusive tax shelters in the early 1980s—
restate an adversarial relationship between taxpayers and the IRS with 
respect to tax shelter opinions issued to taxpayer-clients.208  Achieving an 
open, transparent, and reciprocal tax regulatory environment requires 
altering the rules under which tax practitioners plan transactions and advise 
clients.  
IV.  ELEVATING PRACTICE STANDARDS AND HEIGHTENING 
DISCLOSURE RULES 
A.  The Failure of Self-Regulation 
In 1980, the IRS reported that abusive tax avoidance was threatening 
to destroy the tax system.  Tax shelters were shunting billions of dollars 
from the government, overloading the court system,209 and creating a tax 
administration problem “of major proportions.”210  Nearly 200,000 
individual tax returns representing 18,000 shelter schemes clogged the IRS 
examination and appeals process.211  These returns, IRS Commissioner 
Jerome Kurtz said, involved almost $5 billion “in questionable 
deductions.”212  “The great abuse we are finding in this area,” Kurtz 
warned, “could result in a serious decline in taxpayers’ perception of the 
fairness and evenhandedness of our administration of the tax system and 
consequently in the level of voluntary compliance.”213  The Treasury 
Department’s General Counsel expressed similar fears, stating that the 
“widespread nature” of tax shelters “undermines the public’s confidence in 
the fairness of the tax system,” and ultimately “may affect the level of 
                                                                                                                          
208 ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 346 (1982).  For a fuller discussion of Opinion 346, 
see Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., ABA Formal Opinion 346 and a New Statutory Penalty Regime, 111 TAX 
NOTES 1269 (2006). 
209 Tax shelter litigation accounted for more of the increase in caseload for the U.S. Tax Court 
than any other kind of controversy.  Between 1980 and late 1982, tax shelter cases tripled from 5000 to 
over 15,000, comprising nearly one-third of the entire docket.  New York State Bar Association Tax 
Section, Managing the Tax Court Docket, 85 TNT 146-93 (July 24, 1985). 
210 Jerome Kurtz, Kurtz on “Abusive Tax Shelters,” 10 TAX NOTES 213, 213 (1980).  Beginning 
in the 1970s, tax shelter promoters began peddling tax-favored investments for high-income individuals 
involving the leveraged purchase through partnerships of tax-preferred assets such as real estate or oil 
and gas tax shelters.  These transactions were effectively shut down in the 1980s by a combination of 
legislative fixes—primarily the passive loss rules, see I.R.C. § 469 (2000), and at-risk rules, see id. § 
465—falling inflation, and general tax reform that curtailed tax preferences and lowered rates.  Despite 
these legislative fixes, and largely due to the ingenuity of tax lawyers, new sheltering techniques 
involving complex financial transactions and aggressive arbitrage were soon available to high-income 
taxpayers and corporations.  Unlike the individual tax shelters of the 1970s and 1980s, there was no 
magic legislative bullet to undercut the modern tax shelter transaction.  The tax shelter marketplace of 
the 1990s and 2000s was a different creature altogether, in terms of complexity, dollars lost to the 
federal treasury, and tax advisors playing loose with the rules. 
211 Kurtz, supra note 210, at 213; see also Editor, Little Consensus on IRS Advisory Group, 5 TAX 
NOTES 2 (1977) (discussing the backlog of shelter cases at the examination stage).   
212 Kurtz, supra note 210, at 213.  
213 Id.  
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voluntary compliance.”214  
The Treasury Department felt that tax lawyers were complicit in the 
proliferation of tax shelters.  In particular, the lawyer’s written legal 
opinion legitimized questionable schemes and provided penalty protection 
for taxpayer-clients.215  Attacking tax shelters meant attacking the legal 
opinions, which, in turn, meant attacking the opinion writers, who owed “a 
particular responsibility to Treasury.”216  Through opinion writing, tax 
attorneys “control[led] access to the market place.”217  By virtue of that 
power and “the privileged position given the attorney by our system of law 
and government,” the tax lawyer shouldered professional obligations that 
extended beyond blind client fidelity.218  
The government set about reminding tax practitioners of their multiple 
responsibilities.  By offering amendments in 1980 to Circular 230,219 the 
federal regulations governing standards of tax practice, the Treasury 
Department raised the ethical bar on tax practitioners, deputizing them 
(largely involuntarily) in the fight against abusive tax shelters.220  The 1980 
amendments, in combination with subsequent amendments issued in 
1986,221 1992,222 2000,223 2001,224 and 2003,225 raised due diligence 
requirements for practitioners writing legal opinions; prohibited opinions 
                                                                                                                          
214 Robert H. Mundheim, Mundheim on “Abusive Tax Shelters,” 10 TAX NOTES 213, 213 (1980); 
see also James B. Lewis, The Treasury’s Latest Attack on Tax Shelters, 11 TAX NOTES 723, 723 (1980) 
(noting that tax shelters produce “impairment to the fairness of the income tax, the perception of 
unfairness by the rest of the taxpaying public, and the feared adverse impact on the level and temper of 
voluntary compliance”).  
215 Mundheim, supra note 214, at 213–14 (noting that “the tax opinion is viewed as fraud 
insurance” whereby the investor “is protected against loss” from penalties for underpayment of tax).  
216 Jerome Kurtz, Professional Opinions as “Tickets to the Audit Lottery,” 12 TAX NOTES 262, 
262 (1981). 
217 Mundheim, supra note 214, at 214.  
218 Id.  
219 31 C.F.R. pt. 10 (2007).  Circular 230 regulations govern tax practice “in front of the IRS,” 
which is read broadly to include all written tax advice, from planning to litigation. 
220 See Tax Shelters: Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 45 Fed. Reg. 58,594, 58,594–
95 (proposed Sept. 4, 1980) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10); Regulations Governing the Practice of 
Attorneys, Certified Public Accountants, Enrolled Agents, and Enrolled Actuaries Before the Internal 
Revenue Service, 49 Fed. Reg. 6,719, 6,722 (Feb. 23, 1984) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10).  
221 See Tax Practitioners, 51 Fed. Reg. 29,113, 29,113 (proposed Aug. 14, 1986) (to be codified at 
31 C.F.R. pt. 10).  
222 See Regulations Governing the Practice of Attorneys, Certified Public Accountants, Enrolled 
Agents, and Enrolled Actuaries Before the Internal Revenue Service, 57 Fed. Reg. 46,356, 46,360 
(proposed Oct. 8, 1992) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10). 
223 See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Amendments to the Standards of Practice Governing Tax 
Shelters and Other General Matters, 65 Fed. Reg. 30, 375 (May 11, 2000).  
224 See Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 66 Fed. Reg. 3,276, 
3,294–96 (proposed Jan. 12, 2001) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10); Regulations Governing Practice 
Before the Internal Revenue Service, 67 Fed. Reg. 48,760, 48,771, 48,774 (July 26, 2002) (to be 
codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10). 
225 See Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,186, 
75,189–90 (proposed Dec. 30, 2003) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10); Regulations Governing 
Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 69 Fed. Reg. 75,839, 75,844 (Dec. 20, 2004) (to be 
codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10). 
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that failed to reach a “more likely than not” conclusion that the reporting 
position would prevail if it were challenged and litigated by the 
government; defined broadly what constituted a prohibited “tax shelter”; 
and imposed significant disciplinary penalties on practitioners and their 
firms—including monetary sanctions, public censure, suspension from 
practice, and even disbarment—for failing to meet the federal practice 
standards.  
The Treasury Department called out the professional associations, 
particularly the ABA and AICPA, for ineffectually regulating the 
misconduct of their members.  The abject failure of self-regulation was 
evident in the thriving tax shelter market, and the associations’ abysmally 
low ethical standards contributed directly to the creation, marketing, and 
advising of overaggressive transactions.  When the Treasury Department 
first issued proposed regulations to Circular 230, the ABA’s prevailing 
ethical guidelines allowed a practitioner to advise a client to take 
advantage of a transaction so long as the practitioner believed in good faith 
there was a “reasonable basis” for the transaction, even though she may 
have also believed that the transaction would be challenged, litigated, and 
disallowed.226  A transaction that had a reasonable basis of being sustained 
on the merits was widely recognized to have a 10–20% likelihood of 
success.227  Critics characterized it as “noncompliance with scienter”228 and 
“anything you can articulate without laughing.”229  Furthermore, the 
standard was used to support “any colorable claim,”230 and it facilitated a 
race to the bottom among tax practitioners such that “[t]he one with the 
least conscience gets the best result.”231   
To this day, the ABA recognizes the debased reasonable basis standard 
as a satisfactory level of confidence when advising a client with respect to 
tax controversy representation, as well as negotiation and settlement 
proceedings.  When advising tax reporting positions, the ABA requires a 
slightly higher level of confidence—“realistic possibility of success”—
which allows the lawyer to advise a position so long as she believes in 
good faith the advice possesses a 33% likelihood of success.232  This is the 
                                                                                                                          
226  ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, supra note 206. 
227 See Sheldon I. Banoff, Dealing with the “Authorities”: Determining Valid Legal Authority in 
Advising Clients, Rendering Opinions, Preparing Tax Returns and Avoiding Penalties, 66 TAXES 1072, 
1128 (1988); J. Timothy Philipps et al., What Part of RPOS Don’t You Understand?: An Update and 
Survey of Standards for Tax Return Positions, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1163, 1193 (1994). 
228 John André LeDuc, The Legislative Response of the 97th Congress to Tax Shelters, the Audit 
Lottery, and Other Forms of Intentional or Reckless Noncompliance, 18 TAX NOTES 363, 365 (1983).  
229 Lee A. Sheppard, Ethics Opinion 314 and Tax Shelters Addressed at ABA Meeting, 22 TAX 
NOTES 757, 757 (1984) (quoting law professor Bernard Wolfman). 
230 BERNARD WOLFMAN, JAMES P. HOLDEN & KENNETH L. HARRIS, STANDARDS OF TAX 
PRACTICE: PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ETHICS 59 (1992). 
231 Commissioner Jerome Kurtz and Panel, Discussion on “Questionable Positions,” 32 TAX 
LAW. 13, 24 (1978) (remarks of Commissioner Kurtz). 
232 Formal Op. 85-352, supra note 207.  For interpretation of the reasonable possibility of success 
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same standard used by the AICPA.233  It effectively means that tax 
practitioners can advise taxpayer clients on transactions and reporting 
positions that they believe, if discovered, challenged, and litigated, possess 
a one in three possibility of being sustained on the merits.  
These phenomenally low ethical guidelines encourage a “catch-me-if-
you-can” mentality that subverts statutory purpose and Congressional 
intent.  If we are serious about reducing abusive tax avoidance, we must 
elevate practice standards.  As importantly, we must not leave to the 
professional associations the responsibility of articulating appropriate 
standards and ethical guidelines.  Historically, these organizations have 
promulgated rules benefiting their members’ interests while undermining 
the integrity of the tax system.  Self-regulation has failed.  The history of 
tax shelters in the United States implicates the professional associations 
and their depraved practice standards as culprits in aggressive taxpayer 
behavior, tax avoidance, creative noncompliance, and even evasion.234  
Though the ABA and AICPA have historically been resistant to the 
government imposing practice standards on its respective membership,235 
Congress and the Treasury Department have forced elevated practice 
standards and ethical guidelines on a reluctant practitioner community. 
Congress and Treasury continue to press for additional reforms.  
Having succeeded in applying the more likely than not standard to written 
                                                                                                                          
standard, see Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b) (2008); Banoff, supra note 227, at 1128; Philipps et al., supra 
note 227, at 1193.  
233 AICPA Federal Taxation Executive Committee, Statements on Responsibilities in Tax Practice 
(SRTP), No. 1, Tax Return Positions (rev. 1988).  
234 For a discussion of this history from the 1970s to the 1990s, see Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Raising 
the Ethical Bar for Tax Lawyers: Why We Need Circular 230, 111 TAX NOTES 823 (2006); Dennis J. 
Ventry, Jr., Tax Shelter Opinions Threatened the Tax System in the 1970s, 111 TAX NOTES 947 (2006); 
Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Reasonable Basis and Ethical Standards Before 1980, 111 TAX NOTES 1047 
(2006); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Reaction to the 1980 Proposed Amendments to Circular 230, 111 
TAX NOTES 1141 (2006); Ventry, supra note 208; Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., No Joke: Circular 230 Is Here 
To Stay, 111 TAX NOTES 1409 (2006); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Lowering the Bar: ABA Formal Opinion 
85-352, 112 TAX NOTES 69 (2006); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Filling the Ethical Void: Treasury’s 1986 
Circular 230 Proposal, 112 TAX NOTES 691 (2006); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Vices and Virtues of an 
Objective Reporting Standard, 112 TAX NOTES 1085 (2006); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., IRS Penalty Report: 
A Call for Objective Standards, 112 TAX NOTES 1183 (2006); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Tax Politics and 
the New Substantial Understatement Penalty, 113 TAX NOTES 98 (2006). 
235 With each government incursion into regulating tax practice standards, the professional 
organizations have reacted as if the sky were falling.  In 1980, after the Treasury Department issued 
amendments to Circular 230, the New York State Bar Association stated that the government’s attempt 
to regulate practice standards was inherently dangerous and a threat to “our heritage of freedom.”  New 
York State Bar Association Tax Section, Circular 230 and the Standards Applicable to Tax Shelter 
Opinions, 12 TAX NOTES 251, 259 (1981).  In addition, a future chair of the ABA Section of Taxation 
expressed an opinion shared by the ABA that heightened reporting requirements created “a chilling 
effect on advocacy.”  Paul J. Sax, Lawyer Responsibility in Tax Shelter Opinions, 34 TAX LAW. 5, 44 
(1980).  The Treasury’s more recent amendments to Circular 230 generated a similar reaction.  See 
infra notes 293–97 and accompanying text.  But see Rostain, supra note 55, at 81 (finding a “nuanced 
conception of professionalism” among elite corporate lawyers and the tax bar supporting reforms in 
reporting standards).  
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opinions under Circular 230,236 Congress passed legislation in 2007 
imposing the same standard on tax return preparers under the Code’s 
penalty provisions.237  Under prior law, the Code merely required 
practitioners to reach a “realistic possibility of success” determination 
before advising a taxpayer on undisclosed (non-shelter) positions or 
transactions.238  Under new law, practitioners must demonstrate a 
“reasonable belief” that the tax treatment of an undisclosed position would 
more likely than not be sustained on its merits before advising the 
position.239  For disclosed positions, preparers must show a “reasonable 
basis” for the position (rather than prior law’s “non-frivolous” standard, 
corresponding to a lowly 5–10% chance of success).240  To address 
practitioner concerns pertaining to the implementation of the new standard, 
Treasury issued transitional relief applying prior law to returns filed for tax 
year 2007.241  Moreover, it has continued to evaluate ways to align the 
standard for preparers with that for taxpayers, the latter of which currently 
requires taxpayers to meet a lower threshold—“substantial authority”—for 
reporting a position on a tax return, a level of certainty ranging between 40 
and 51%.242  The higher standard for tax practitioners compared to 
taxpayers “has caused much angst for accountants and attorneys.”243  In 
particular, practitioners have complained about a potential conflict of 
interest vis-à-vis taxpayer clients, as well as greater costs for taxpayers, 
practitioners, and the government.244  
                                                                                                                          
236 See supra note 219.  
237 Small Business and Work Opportunity Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-28, § 8246, 121 Stat. 200, 
(2007); see also Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 6694–95, 73 Fed. Reg. 34,560 (June 17, 2008) [hereinafter Prop. 
Treas. Reg. §§ 6694–95].  
238 IRS Notice 2008-13, 2008-3 I.R.B. 282. 
239 Id. 
240 Id.  A practitioner possesses a “reasonable belief” that the position would more likely than not  
be sustained on the merits if she analyzes the pertinent facts and authorities in the manner described in 
Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(g)(4) (2008) and, in reliance upon that analysis, “reasonably concludes in good 
faith that there is a greater than 50% likelihood that the tax treatment of the item will be upheld if 
challenged by the IRS.”  IRS Notice 2008-13, supra note 238, at *13–14.  “Reasonable basis” under the 
new law is interpreted in accordance with Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3), the threshold for which reflects 
“a relatively high standard of tax reporting, that is, significantly higher than not frivolous or not 
patently improper.  The reasonable basis standard is not satisfied by a return position that is merely 
arguable or that is merely a colorable claim.”  Id. 
241 IRS Notice 2007-54, 2007-27 I.R.B. 12; IRS Notice 2008-11, 2008-3 I.R.B. 279.  
242 Alison Bennett, Desmond Discusses Range of Issues Under New Preparer Penalty Standards, 
234 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-11 (Dec. 6, 2007).  For the taxpayer understatement penalty and 
substantial authority requirement, see I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(i) (2000); INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 
EXECUTIVE TASK FORCE, COMMISSIONER’S PENALTY STUDY, REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES, 
CHAPTER 8 (1989), at 43 (substantial authority “should approach” 51% but could extend as low as 
45%); Philipps, et al., supra note 227, at 1193 (“around 40%”).  But see Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(2) 
(2008) (providing an even wider range in defining the substantial authority standard as “less stringent 
than the more likely than not standard [i.e., 51%] . . . but more stringent than the reasonable basis 
standard [i.e., 10–20%]”).  
243 Diane Freda, Webcast Highlights Questions on Guidance on Tax Preparer Standards, 10 
DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-4 (Jan. 16, 2008). 
244 See New York State Bar Association Tax Section, Recent and Proposed Statutory Changes to 
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Though practitioners had hoped that Treasury would equalize the 
standards by lowering the tax preparer standard to “substantial 
authority,”245 Treasury appears committed to the higher, more likely than 
not standard for practitioners.246  This commitment indicates that to the 
extent Treasury equalizes the standards, it will raise the threshold for 
taxpayers rather than lower the threshold for practitioners.  A more likely 
than not requirement for both taxpayers and tax practitioners would 
encourage taxpayers and their advisors to work together to locate the most 
likely “correct” answer for return positions.  In this way, the more likely 
than not standard would reinforce the familiar jurat on the Form 1040 
requiring a taxpayer to attest “[u]nder penalties of perjury” that she has 
examined her return, and to the best of her “knowledge and belief it is true, 
correct, and complete.”  If the affidavit is to have any meaning—indeed, if 
“true, correct, and complete” is to have any meaning—it must mean that 
the taxpayer believes that an asserted position will be adjudged “correct” at 
least half the time.247  In addition, a more likely than not standard forces 
practitioners to reject “literalist interpretations that break the connection 
between language and underlying purpose” of the tax law.248  
In addition to reinforcing a purposive approach to statutory 
interpretation, a more likely than not standard would augment principles of 
reciprocity, taxpayer-government interaction, and regulatory transparency.  
If a practitioner and her client wish to assert a position that fails to meet the 
more likely than not standard, perhaps one they believe in good faith 
reinforces the purpose of the statute, they should be able to do so as long as 
they disclose it on the return.  Predicting whether a reporting position will 
prevail if litigated contains inherent uncertainties, particularly when courts 
can rely on language of the statute, purpose of the transaction, legislative 
intent, or any combination of the three.  Disclosure provides a legitimate 
option for taxpayers wanting to test or clarify a law or assert a non-
                                                                                                                          
Tax Return Preparer Penalty Rules of Internal Revenue Code Section 6694 and Related Issues, 
available at 18 TAXCORE (BNA) (Jan. 19, 2008) (urging adoption of substantial authority standard 
rather than more likely than not standard to unify preparer and taxpayer standards and to avoid conflicts 
of interest); American Bar Association Section of Taxation, Comments on Changes to Standards for 
Imposition of Certain Penalties, available at 222 TAXCORE (BNA) (Nov. 19, 2007) (discussing 
increased burdens, conflict of interest, and preference for substantial authority over more likely than 
not); American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Statement Submitted to Senate Finance 
Committee, Filing Your Taxes: An Ounce of Prevention is Worth a Pound of Cure (2007) (arguing that 
the higher reporting standard would impose “an unworkable burden for the entire tax system” by 
prompting excessive disclosure). 
245 Id.  
246 See Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 6694–95, 73 Fed. Reg. 34, 564. 
247 The same can be said of I.R.C. § 7206(1) (2000), which makes it a felony for an individual to 
“willfully” make and subscribe to a tax return which she does not believe “to be true and correct as to 
every material matter.”  See Calvin Johnson, “True and Correct”: Standards for Tax Return 
Reporting,” 43 TAX NOTES 1521 (1989).   
248 Linda M. Beale, Tax Advice Before the Return: The Case for Raising Standards and Denying 
Evidentiary Privileges, 25 VA. TAX REV. 583, 639 (2006).  
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frivolous but weak position.  Additionally, taxpayers could seek pre-filing 
resolution of uncertain positions from the IRS.  To the extent taxpayers 
prefer review by the courts rather than the Service, Congress or Treasury 
could institute expedited refund claim procedures whereby taxpayers could 
report and pay tax liability based on the more likely than not standard, and 
simultaneously file a refund claim requesting immediate administrative 
denial of the claim to facilitate judicial review.249 
It is important to acknowledge that a more likely than not standard 
would not necessarily eliminate abusive behavior.  First, nearly all of the 
legal opinions that propped up the most notorious tax shelters of the 1990s 
and 2000s concluded that the underlying transactions were at least more 
likely than not correct.250  Elevated standards would not have deterred the 
creation and marketing of these transactions.  Second, raising the required 
level of certainty to more likely than not—or even “should” or “will”— 
would do nothing to alter the behavior of tax lawyers who conceive of their 
role as legal advisors to include only a duty to inform clients of potential 
penalties associated with positions falling below statutory requirements.251  
Third, heightened reporting standards would not stop lawyers from orally 
advising overaggressive positions, a form of advice not currently covered 
by Treasury regulations pertaining to written opinions.252  In fact, oral 
advice can circumvent any standard, particularly given the difficulties of 
                                                                                                                          
249 Id. at 642.   
250 See, e.g., Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 2007) (involving a legal opinion 
concluding that a BLIPS [Bond Linked Issue Premium Structure] transaction was more likely than not  
valid); Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, LLC v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 2d 885 (E.D. Tex. 2007) 
(involving a legal opinion from a different law firm concluding that a BLIPS transaction was more 
likely than not valid); Hoehn Family LLC v. PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, No. 07-0069, 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 23422 (D. Mont. Mar. 30, 2007) (involving a legal opinion concluding that a FLIP 
transaction [Foreign Leverage Investment Program] was more likely than not valid); Denney v. Jenkens 
& Gilchrist, 340 F. Supp. 2d 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (involving a legal opinion concluding that a COBRA 
[Currency Options Bring Reward Alternatives] transaction was more likely than not valid).  
251 Imagine the following scenario: A client comes to her tax advisor with a transaction that relies 
on a literal reading of the statute and that reflects a confidence level of 25% chance of success.  How 
should the tax lawyer advise that client?  Many attorneys would respond that all that is required is to 
predict how the IRS or the courts will react to the transaction.  Under this view, it is not the role of the 
lawyer to say “yes” or “no” to the transaction based on the lawyer’s personal views of the morality of 
the deal, the purpose of the statute, or what will happen to the tax system if the transaction works.  It is 
the lawyer’s role to review with the client all statutory and non-statutory requirements of the law.  But 
beyond that, the lawyer is merely required to inform the client of the likelihood that the transaction will 
be upheld if challenged, as well as the likelihood of penalties if it is challenged and not upheld.  At that 
point, the lawyer has fully complied with all applicable ethical and professional duties, and the client 
can decide for herself if she wants to engage in the transaction and how she wants to report it.  The 
tougher scenario involves the lawyer developing the 25% likelihood of success transaction herself and 
subsequently peddling it to her client.  Even then, many lawyers would condone such behavior so long 
as the lawyer fully disclosed the risks associated with the transaction.  
252 See infra note 253.  Conversations with practitioners in New York, Los Angeles, and 
Washington, DC, revealed that some tax lawyers have responded to the more likely than not standard 
for certain written opinions by issuing advice orally, supplemented by internal memoranda used as 
talking points with clients, the latter of which are considered privileged and therefore neither 
disclosable nor discoverable absent client waiver. 
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policing advice without a paper trail and with the protective shield of 
privilege.  
Notwithstanding these limitations, a more likely than not standard 
would assist in transforming compliance norms.  If we remain concerned 
about the above loopholes (that is, a limited duty for attorneys and the shift 
to oral advice not covered by current opinion standards), we might 
consider extending the heightened standard to oral as well as written 
advice, and eliminating privilege and work-product protection from pre-
return tax planning.253  Even absent such reforms, a more likely than not 
reporting standard would discourage literal interpretations of the law in so 
far as such analyses would lack sufficient authority beyond statutory 
language.  
If policymakers were reluctant to apply the more likely than not 
standard to areas outside tax law, they might consider extending a radical 
reform currently taking place within tax law.  In August 2005, the 
Department of Justice entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with 
KPMG as part of its multi-billion dollar criminal tax fraud investigation 
involving abusive tax shelters.254  The signed agreement is a remarkable 
document, and imposes permanent restrictions on KPMG’s tax practice, 
including requiring the firm to: cease (with limited exceptions) its private 
                                                                                                                          
253 See Beale, supra note 248, at 644–68 (arguing for eliminating privilege and work-product 
protection from pre-return tax planning).  The subject of attorney-client and work-product protection 
has received considerable attention of late in the tax world.  The Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) has reinterpreted how tax practitioners should account for uncertainty in income taxes on 
financial statements.  FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., FASB INTERPRETATION NO. 48: ACCOUNTING FOR 
UNCERTAINTY IN INCOME TAXES 1 (2006).  The FASB Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 48) requires 
companies to conduct detailed issue-by-issue analyses of all tax positions, an inquiry that generates 
documents and disclosures tracking legal analysis of tax advisors on a company’s transactions.  Id. at 
32.  These documents, in turn, may become integrated into the tax accrual workpapers of a company’s 
auditors who review them before signing off on financial statements.  Under longstanding Supreme 
Court precedent, if the documents become part of the auditor’s workpapers, they are no longer 
privileged and therefore subject to disclosure to the IRS.  See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 
465 U.S. 805, 815–17 (1984) (finding tax accrual workpapers not privileged if requested under IRS 
summons power provided in I.R.C. § 7602).  Practitioners have expressed concern that disclosure of 
internal evaluations pertaining to uncertain tax positions waives protection of the evaluations to future 
discovery requests, and provides tax officials with a heretofore protected roadmap for locating and 
challenging soft spots in a taxpayer’s return.  See Tom Jaworski & Allen Kenney, PCAOB Officials 
Discuss Tax Accrual Workpapers, FIN 48, 2007 TAX NOTES TODAY 48-6 (Mar. 12, 2007), available in 
LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File; Fred F. Murray, FASB and IRS Working on FIN 48 Implementation, 
DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at J-1 (Mar. 15, 2007).  Recently, a federal court in Rhode Island and another 
in Alabama refused to enforce IRS summonses by finding tax accrual workpapers privileged under the 
work-product doctrine.  United States v. Textron Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138 (D.R.I. 2007); Regions Fin. 
Corp. v. United States, No. 2:06-CV-00895-RDP, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41940 (N.D. Ala. May 8, 
2008).  The government has appealed both cases.  For a critique of the cases and a discussion of their 
adverse implications on tax enforcement, see Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Protecting Abusive Tax Avoidance, 
120 TAX NOTES 857 (2008).  
254 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, KPMG DEFERRED PROSECUTION AGREEMENT 1 (2005), 
http://www.usdoj.gov.usao/nys/pressreleases/August05/kpmgdpagmt.pdf [hereinafter DPA]; IRS News 
Release IR-2205-83 (Aug. 29, 2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom.article.0,,id= 
146999,00.html.  
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client tax practice as well as its compensation and benefits practice; refrain 
from developing, marketing, selling, or implementing pre-packaged tax 
products; and restrict severely its tax preparation services.255  
More importantly, the deferred prosecution agreement requires KPMG 
to apply significantly elevated standards to its tax practice.  Rather than the 
otherwise prevailing more likely than not standard, the agreement requires 
KPMG to meet a “should” standard for all “covered opinions,”256 as well 
as for tax return preparation involving “principal purpose”257 or “listed”258 
transactions.  These elevated standards apply to transactions involving all 
taxpayer-clients, including individuals, private enterprises, and public 
corporations.  Moreover, the agreement mandates that KPMG adhere to 
elevated standards when providing covered opinions for individuals and 
private entities on non-controversial transactions (“should” rather than 
“more likely than not”) and when providing tax return preparation on all 
other transactions (“more likely than not ” rather than “realistic possibility 
of success”).259  Only when advising large private entities and public 
corporations on non-controversial transactions and run-of-the-mill tax 
return preparation may KPMG follow the same standards as other 
practitioners.260  While firms have not rushed to adopt similarly high 
standards, there has been no observable, adverse impact on KPMG’s tax 
practice associated with the heightened requirements.  
B.  Disclosure Rules for Increased Transparency and Certainty 
Practice standards by themselves will not alter practitioner behavior.  
To animate the standards and to change behavior, tax officials must have at 
their disposal some way to determine if practitioners are complying with 
the heightened requirements.  Stricter disclosure rules provide the window 
through which the government can monitor tax practitioner and taxpayer 
behavior.  As part of the deferred prosecution agreement discussed above, 
KPMG agreed to oversight for three years by an “independent monitor” 
that, among other things, will ensure that KPMG is acting in accordance 
with the agreement.261  At the end of the monitor’s term, the IRS will 
                                                                                                                          
255 DPA, supra note 254, at 4–5. 
256 Covered opinions include: listed transactions, see supra note 162, or a substantially similar 
transaction, 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(i)(A) (2007); a transaction, the principal purpose of which is the 
avoidance of tax, id. § 10.35(b)(2)(i)(B); or a transaction, a significant purpose of which is the 
avoidance of tax, if the opinion is either a reliance opinion, a marketed opinion, an opinion subject to 
conditions of confidentiality, or an opinion subject to contractual protection, id. § 10.35(b)(2)(i)(C).  
257 See 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-4(g)(2)(ii)(C) (2005) (defining principal purpose as any plan or 
arrangement designed to avoid or evade federal income tax such that the motive to avoid or evade 
exceeds any other motivation). 
258 See supra note 162. 
259 DPA, supra note 254, at 7. 
260 Id. 
261 See id. at 18.  
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oversee KPMG’s “compliance with the restrictions and elevated standards” 
for an additional two years.262  The monitoring can be thought of as an 
extreme form of mandatory disclosure.  
Disclosure, in and of itself, can be a good thing.263  It helps the 
government identify prohibited or potentially prohibited behavior.  
Disclosure also alters norms by adding risk to a taxpayer’s evaluation of 
whether and how to comply with the law.  Disclosure provides a 
particularly effective incentive in the presence of low audit rates, where 
taxpayers otherwise evaluate risks with little concern that their reporting 
position will be seen by the government.  In fact, disclosure can alter 
compliance norms not only with respect to plainly prohibited or probably 
prohibited transactions, but also with respect to probably permissible 
transactions, particularly if the government might designate those 
transactions as prohibited in the future.264  Of course, there is such a thing 
as too much disclosure, where the government cannot process the 
information or the taxpayer is overburdened by the requirements.265  
However, so long as the advantages of disclosure (e.g., altering wasteful 
planning and avoidance behavior) exceed the disadvantages (e.g., 
overburdening the government or the taxpayer), disclosure requirements 
should be included in any tax compliance strategy.  
The combination of elevated practice standards and heightened 
disclosure rules can shift compliance norms.  Prevailing standards based on 
adversarial norms encourage literalist interpretations of the law because 
such interpretations can provide sufficient authority if challenged and 
litigated.  Meanwhile, practice standards based on a more likely than not 
norm reinforce a purposive approach to statutory interpretation.  With 
elevated standards, practitioners have to do more than simply rely on 
statutory language to support a position, particularly in the presence of 
                                                                                                                          
262 Id. at 25.  
263 See, e.g., Peter C. Canellos, A Tax Practitioner’s Perspective on Substance, Form and 
Business Purpose in Structuring Business Transactions and in Tax Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 47, 69–70 
(2001) (stating that to combat “what amounts to audit lottery and to nip schemes in the bud, airtight, 
focused, prompt and efficient disclosure rules are required”); Victor Fleischer, Options Backdating, Tax 
Shelters, and Corporate Culture, 26 VA. TAX REV. 1031, 1060 n.96 (2007) (disclosure can alter 
taxpayer norms, “[e]ven with a low risk of audit”).  But see David A. Weisbach, The Failure of 
Disclosure as an Approach to Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 73, 73–78 (2001) (arguing that disclosure will 
not curb abusive behavior, and may even worsen it by producing continual changes to substantive law 
around which lawyers could plan). 
264 This is basically Dan Shaviro’s point respecting the new category of reportable deals, 
“transactions of interest.”  See supra note 107.  According to Shaviro, requiring disclosure of these 
transactions is “important and valuable” for several reasons, including “the prospect that a deal not 
currently required to be disclosed may subsequently become so,” which, in turn, “may serve as a 
socially valuable deterrent when taxpayers are contemplating in questionable newly designed 
transactions.”  Shaviro, supra note 115, at 33.  
265 See Joshua D. Blank, Overcoming Disclosure: Toward Tax Shelter Detection, 56 UCLA L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1285342 (arguing that mandatory 
disclosure rules can result in opportunistic overdisclosure that could hamper anti-shelter efforts).  
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heightened disclosure requirements.  They have to examine additional 
sources of statutory interpretation (such as legislative intent and public 
purpose), and they have to evaluate how individual statutes interact with 
other statutes, as well as how that interaction might reinforce or destroy the 
underlying purpose of the statutes in combination with each other.  
Heightened disclosure rules under a more likely than not standard in 
the tax context should be viewed as part of a larger trend toward greater 
corporate transparency.  Within the last several years, the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (Sarbanes-Oxley) has subjected corporations to significantly stricter 
disclosure rules266 and internal controls.267  Sarbanes-Oxley also 
established the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to regulate 
the auditors of public companies and to conduct independent investigations 
and disciplinary proceedings of public accounting violations.268  Other 
recent changes to federal securities law require registered companies to 
provide “material historical and prospective textual disclosure”269 relevant 
to an understanding of its financial condition.270  In addition, the IRS has 
rolled out new Schedule M-3 as part of the corporate tax return to help the 
IRS find relevant information (assuming all cash is accounted for properly 
on the return) by reconciling a corporation’s financial accounting income 
(i.e., “book income”) with its taxable income (i.e., “tax income”).271  
Finally, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has instituted 
significant changes to how companies account for uncertainty in income 
taxes recognized on financial statements.  FASB Interpretation No. 48 
(FIN 48) clarifies the treatment of unrealized income tax benefits and 
liabilities on financial statements by requiring domestic public companies 
to assess whether their tax positions are more likely than not correct and to 
reflect the results of that assessment in financial disclosures.272  If a 
taxpayer determines that a position meets or exceeds the more likely than 
not standard, it can report the tax benefit without setting aside 
corresponding reserves; if not, it must provide adequate reserves to cover 
                                                                                                                          
266 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 204, §§ 406–07, 116 Stat. 745; Disclosure 
Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
47,235, 79 SEC Docket 1077 (Jan. 24, 2003). 
267 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2006); Management’s Reports on 
Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic 
Reports, Exchange Act Release No. 34-47,986, 80 SEC Docket 1014 (June 5, 2003). 
268 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 101, 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (establishing the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board and outlining its duties).  
269 Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations; 
Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Exchange Act Release No. 34-26,831, 43 SEC Docket 1330 
(May 18, 1989). 
270 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2008). 
271 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DRAFT OF SCHEDULE M-3 (FORM 1120-F), NET INCOME (LOSS) 
RECONCILIATION FOR FOREIGN CORPORATIONS WITH REPORTABLE ASSETS OF $10 MILLION OR MORE 
(2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-dft/f1120fm3--dft.pdf. 
272 See supra note 253.  
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the contingency.  According to the IRS, FIN 48 increases transparency, 
assists the government in distinguishing between compliant and 
noncompliant taxpayers, and provides corporate taxpayers greater certainty 
with respect to tax reporting positions.273 
All these reporting regimes share the same goal of enhanced 
transparency.  Regulated parties possess information that the government 
wants, but they are reluctant to turn over the information without good 
reason.  Indeed, turning over the information typically puts a party at a 
disadvantage vis-à-vis other parties.  Heightened disclosure rules provide 
“good reason” to report relevant information, while elevated practice 
standards provide the framework to evaluate one’s responsibilities under 
the rules.  The last Part of this Article continues this discussion by 
examining the regulatory tradeoffs between rules versus standards in 
facilitating compliance, and by evaluating the government’s recent 
attempts to regulate the behavior of tax practitioners through a combination 
of the two approaches. 
V.  RULES VS. STANDARDS AND THE FEDERAL REGULATION OF TAX 
PRACTITIONERS 
A.  Rules vs. Standards and Cooperative Regulation 
As tax regulators continue to work with tax professionals and 
taxpayers to improve compliance, the government needs at its disposal a 
judicious mix of rules and standards.  Rules provide certainty of outcome 
and lower compliance costs, and enhance due process and fair treatment.  
Standards, for their part, breathe life into rules, adding context, intent, and 
purpose to text and language.  In other words, standards provide coherence 
to a bunch of otherwise independent rules by giving them an overarching 
purpose.  Reliance on rules alone would require that legislators, regulators, 
and legislative drafters possess a crystal ball to predict all potential uses 
and abuses of each and every tax provision, both in isolation and in 
combination with each other.274  Even if policymakers were somehow 
                                                                                                                          
273 See, e.g., Weinberger et al., supra note 79, at 60–61 (remarks of Deborah Nolan, viewing FIN 
48 disclosures as part of an “environment of increased transparency,” and stating that FIN 48 
“increases the corporate taxpayer’s need for certainty, where we might be able to provide a service.  
And from a practical standpoint, it could provide us with additional information and data for our risk 
assessment tools as well”). 
274 Given the infinite transactional permutations for tax planning, relying on rules alone would be 
futile and even irresponsible.  See David P. Hariton, When and How Should the Economic Substance 
Doctrine Be Applied?, 60 TAX L. REV. 29, 33 (2006) (“No government can foresee, let alone draft, 
rules that produce the ‘right’ tax results under every conceivable permutation of facts that can be 
constructed by taxpayers in an increasingly complex financial world.”); see also Stanley S. Surrey, 
Complexity and the Internal Revenue Code: The Problem of the Management of Tax Detail, 34 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 673, 707 n.31 (1969) (writing that standards reduce complexity, and “save the tax 
system from the far greater proliferation of detail that would be necessary if the tax avoider could 
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equipped with the power to see into the future, reliance on rules alone 
would yield an unduly complex and distortive regime.  Standards by 
themselves are not the solution either.  The flexibility of standards can be a 
virtue in assisting regulators and courts in responding to unpredictable 
taxpayer behavior.  But such flexibility can also produce increased 
uncertainty, higher compliance costs, and behavioral distortions.  
Moreover, standards run the risk of producing a one-way street in favor of 
the government, with tax authorities administering and enforcing the law 
with wide and arbitrary discretion.  Also, depending on the regulatory 
culture and whether practitioners have the wrong attitude about what they 
are supposed to do for clients, standards can encourage literalist 
interpretations of the law as much as bright-line rules.  In fact, bright-line 
rules may reflect an effort on behalf of regulators to stop abuses of more 
ambiguous standards. 
Coordinated use of comprehensible rules and anti-abuse standards 
holds the promise of achieving optimal tax compliance with lower costs for 
taxpayers, tax regulators, and the tax system.275  A balanced compliment of 
rules and standards allows tax authorities to enunciate general principles 
and goals underlying the rules, and to rely on tax professionals and 
taxpayers to implement and fulfill those goals.  Recently, courts have 
scrutinized tax practitioners’ alleged compliance with legal rules in light of 
underlying standards, both with respect to applicable ethical standards as 
well as common law doctrines such as economic substance, business 
purpose, and substance over form.276  Complying with the literal terms of a 
statute or other legal rule was not necessarily enough in these cases; courts 
required practitioners to show compliance with the purpose of statutory 
language and respect for the coherence of the system. 
Without standards to overlay rules, tax planning would run amok.  
Bright-line rules encourage literalist interpretations of the law and a 
myopic focus on form over substance.  Faced with a bright-line rule, some 
tax advisors view it as their job to obscure and expand the line.277  The 
“ultimate question” in tax practice, law professor James Eustice has noted, 
is “where ‘the line’ is between acceptable tax planning and unacceptable 
                                                                                                                          
succeed merely by bringing his scheme within the literal language of substantive provisions written to 
govern the everyday world”). 
275 For a general discussion of rules and standards in tax law, see Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus 
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L. J. 557, 586–96 (1992), and David A. Weisbach, 
Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 CHI. L. REV. 860, 863–77 (1999). 
276 See supra note 250; see also infra note 289 for respresentative cases, and infra note 287 for the 
common law doctrines.  
277 See David P. Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle of Economic Substance, 52 TAX LAW. 235, 238 
(1999) (stating that some lawyers’ “reverence for our objective method of determining tax liabilities 
approaches something like religious fervor (or more cynically, they recognize that results based to the 
maximum extent on the unadulterated application of objective rules tend to aggrandize both the power 
and the pocketbook of the tax practitioner)”). 
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overreaching, and, equally important, how clear that line should be.”278  
Tax shelters, practitioner-scholar Peter Canellos has said, though perhaps 
on the legal side of the line, “almost always ignor[e] the underlying 
purpose of the law.”279  Standards provide a check on unadulterated tax 
reduction, and they offer the government, courts, and aggrieved taxpayers 
powerful weapons to wield against overreaching practitioners. 
In recent years, the government has balanced rules with standards in its 
effort to improve compliance.  As we have seen, the new rules include an 
enhanced statutory penalty regime and heightened disclosure 
requirements.280  With respect to standards, the government has adopted 
various anti-abuse rules and ethical guidelines to highlight the coherence of 
an otherwise independent set of rules.  The anti-abuse “rules” operate more 
like standards.  Typically promulgated by regulation but occasionally 
embedded directly in a statute, they override otherwise applicable legal 
rules when taxpayers enter into aggressive tax avoidance transactions 
deemed to violate the purposes of the statute or regulation.  A transaction 
can run afoul of an anti-abuse rule even if it otherwise complies with 
statutory language.  The use of such rules covers an increasing number of 
transactions, including the tax treatment of partnerships,281 consolidated 
returns,282 debt instruments,283 interest-rate, equity and commodity 
swaps,284 and net operating loss limitations.285  Essentially, the various 
anti-abuse rules reflect the spirit of common law doctrines that look to the 
overarching effect and purpose of a transaction rather than whether a 
taxpayer complied formulaically with the letter of the law.  The anti-abuse 
rules for partnerships, for example, provide that if a partnership “is formed 
or availed of in connection with a transaction a principal purpose of which 
is to reduce substantially the present value of the partners’ aggregate 
federal tax liability in a manner that is inconsistent with the intent” of the 
partnership provisions, the government “can recast the transaction for 
federal tax purposes.”286  The anti-abuse rules parse the difference between 
the letter of the law and its spirit. 
Anti-abuse rules also reflect explicit application of longstanding 
judicial doctrines that adopt a purposive rather than a literalist 
interpretation of the tax law.  The most commonly known doctrines include 
economic substance, business purpose, sham transaction, and substance 
                                                                                                                          
278 James S. Eustice, Abusive Corporate Tax Shelters: Old “Brine” in New Bottles, 55 TAX L. 
REV. 135, 136 (2002). 
279 Canellos, supra note 263, at 52. 
280 See supra Part IV. 
281 Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2 (2008). 
282 Id. § 1.1502-95. 
283 Id. § 1.1275-2. 
284 Id. § 1.446-3. 
285 Id. § 1.172-3. 
286 Id. § 1.701-2(b). 
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over form.287  The economic substance doctrine has been a particularly 
effective tool in the fight against tax shelters and reflects an amalgam of 
the other common law doctrines.  At its core, it represents a judicial effort 
“to prevent taxpayers from subverting the legislative purpose of the tax 
code by engaging in transactions that are fictitious or lack economic reality 
simply to reap a tax benefit.”288  In a stunning series of recent victories for 
the government, judges have wielded the economic substance doctrine to 
invalidate abusive transactions.289  Though courts acknowledge that 
taxpayers possess “an unquestioned right to decrease or avoid . . . taxes by 
means which the law permits,”290 they also perceive “a material difference 
between structuring a real transaction in a particular way to provide a tax 
benefit (which is legitimate), and creating a transaction, without a business 
purpose, in order to create a tax benefit (which is illegitimate).”291  The 
anti-abuse rules and judicial doctrines are designed to help taxpayers and 
tax regulators discern the real from the unreal, and thereby deter abusive 
tax avoidance behavior. 
B.  An Enforceable Normative Standard 
The Treasury Department regulations governing tax practice also 
attempt to assist taxpayers and tax officials in discerning real from unreal 
transactions.  To this end, the regulations employ a combination of 
elevated practice standards and strict disclosure rules that produce an 
enforceable normative standard.292  This standard, backed by the threat of 
                                                                                                                          
287 For discussions of these doctrines, see Ellen P. Aprill, Tax Shelters, Tax Law, and Morality: 
Codifying Judicial Doctrines, 54 SMU. L. REV. 9 (2001); Joseph Bankman, The Business Purpose 
Doctrine and the Sociology of Tax, 54 SMU. L. REV. 149 (2001); Joseph Bankman, The Economic 
Substance Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 5 (2000); Canellos, supra note 263; Hariton, supra note 274; 
Hariton, supra note 277; Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Save the Economic Substance Doctrine from Congress, 
118 TAX NOTES 1405 (2008). 
288 Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 
127 S. Ct. 1261 (2007). 
289 See, e.g., BB&T Corp. v. United States, 523 F.3d 461 (4th Cir. 2008); Cemco Investors, LLC 
v. United States, 515 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2008); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 435 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 
2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1251 (2007); TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States, 459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 
2006); Coltec Indus., 454 F.3d at 1340; Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 
2006); Jade Trading, LLC v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 11 (2007), reconsideration denied, 81 Fed. Cl. 
173 (2008); Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, LLC v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 2d 885 (E.D. Tex. 2007); 
H.J. Heinz Co. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 570 (2007).  
290 Jade Trading, 80 Fed. Cl. at 45.  This sentiment is captured most famously in the oft-quoted 
line from Gregory v. Helvering: “The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what 
otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits, cannot be 
doubted.”  Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).  The next line from the opinion is just as 
famous, though primarily due to its omission by pro-taxpayer courts and commentators: “But the 
question for determination is whether what was done, apart from the tax motive, was the thing which 
the statute intended.”  Id. 
291 Coltec Indus., 454 F.3d at 1357. 
292 See Camilla E. Watson, Legislating Morality: The Duty to the Tax System Reconsidered, 51 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 1197, 1236–37 (2003) (concluding that an enforceable normative standard is needed to 
discourage abusive tax planning); see also Anthony C. Infanti, Eyes Wide Shut: Surveying Erosion in 
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palpable sanctions, discourages abusive tax avoidance, while encouraging 
tax practitioners to adopt non-literal statutory interpretations and to make 
themselves aware of the public purposes underlying the tax laws. 
The new Circular 230 rules impose significant responsibilities on tax 
practitioners.  When the Treasury Department proposed its most recent 
amendments to tax practice standards, practitioners freaked out.  
Accountants Burgess and William Raby, the latter a former chair of the 
AICPA’s Federal Tax Division, warned that tax practitioners and their 
clients were helplessly “caught up in a paradigm shift” that could alter tax 
practice as we know it.293  Practitioner “hue and cry”294 further charged that 
the new rules covering legal opinions and other written advice were 
“irrational” and “impediments to practice.”295  They would “drive a wedge 
between taxpayer and professional advisor,” lead to “intimidation tactics,” 
dramatically increase the cost of tax advice, and push clients to 
disreputable practitioners.296  Taxpayers, tax advisors, tax officials, and the 
tax system would all be better off if Treasury simply “thr[e]w in the 
towel,” and abandoned its twenty-five year effort to regulate tax shelters by 
regulating tax professionals.297  
Practitioners may have overreacted to the new regulations, but they 
were right about one thing: the new rules had everything to do with 
regulating noncompliance by regulating practitioners.  There are 
shortcomings to this strategy, to be sure, and tax officials need to recognize 
the “intrinsic limits of practitioner regulation in controlling the behavior of 
clients.”298  Tax practitioners cannot change the hearts of taxpayers nor, for 
that matter, their desire for lower taxes.  But tax practitioners do have a 
responsibility to lead clients, particularly if a client’s normative standards 
threaten the coherence of the system and the underlying purpose of the tax 
laws.  At some point, the practitioner must “stop being a tax advisor and 
become a professional,”299 obliged to follow a moral compass that asks 
more of her than morals articulated in positive legal rules. 
If we are uncomfortable or unconvinced by such moral injunctions, the 
                                                                                                                          
the Professionalism of the Tax Bar, 22 VA. TAX REV. 589, 590 (2003) (writing that there has been a 
“true erosion in the professionalism of the tax bar”). 
293 Burgess J.W. Raby & William L. Raby, Penalty Protection for the Taxpayer: Circular 230 
and the Code, 107 TAX NOTES 1257, 1257 (2005). 
294 Deborah H. Schenk, The Circular 230 Amendments: Time to Throw Them Out and Start Over, 
110 TAX NOTES 1311, 1318 (2006).  
295 Sheryl Stratton, Tax Officials Spar with Tax Bar over Circular 230, 107 TAX NOTES 1082, 
1082–83 (2005) (quoting practitioners).  
296 Dan W. Holbrook, Imagine the Worst the U.S. Treasury Could Do to Us—They’ve Done It: 
Revenge of the IRS: Circular 230 Changes Law Practice, 41 TENN. B.J. 28, 30 (2005).  
297 Schenk, supra note 294, at 1311.  
298 Michael C. Durst, The Tax Lawyer’s Professional Responsibility, 39 FLA. L. REV. 1027, 1030 
(1987). 
299 George Cooper, The Avoidance Dynamic: A Tale of Tax Planning, Tax Ethics, and Tax 
Reform, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1553, 1581 (1980). 
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less overtly moral trappings of economic theory can lead us to similar 
conclusions.  Modern economic thought holds that it is appropriate for 
regulators to shift the cost of compliance to the party or parties with the 
lower cost of monitoring.300  If the social value of the noncompliant 
activity is low, moreover, the socially optimal penalty for engaging in 
noncompliance can be quite large.  In the realm of tax compliance, 
practitioners are undoubtedly in better positions to detect and deter 
noncompliance at lower cost than taxpayers or tax officials.  They are “the 
first line of defense” against overaggressive tax avoidance.301  It is 
therefore appropriate to shift the cost of compliance to practitioners and to 
regulate their behavior with an enforceable normative standard as a way to 
regulate the behavior of taxpayers.302  It is also appropriate to impose 
severe, socially optimal penalties on their noncompliant behavior, at least 
insofar as we believe advising aggressive tax avoidance schemes contains 
little or no social value.   
The new federal rules regulating tax practice are far from perfect.  In 
some respects, they are overbroad, sweeping in plainly uncontroversial tax 
advice.303  The prevailing regime, in an attempt to improve transparency, 
also imposes unnecessary costs and inefficiencies on practitioners and 
clients, by, among other things, requiring practitioners to “prominently 
disclose” in all written advice that such advice cannot be used for purposes 
of avoiding penalties.304  This requirement has resulted in the ubiquitous 
“no-penalty reliance” legend that practitioners now routinely append to 
every written communication, not just official client communications and 
                                                                                                                          
300 See, e.g., Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and 
Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15 (1974) (concluding that private enforcement of 
public laws can be more efficient than public enforcement).  
301 Tom Gilroy, IRS Chief Counsel Calls Practitioners “First Line of Defense” Against Fraud, 
DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-3 (Oct. 25, 2006) (quoting IRS Chief Counsel Korb).  
302 Recent changes to securities law also shift the cost of compliance to practitioners on the theory 
that insiders, particularly lawyer-insiders, are well-positioned to identify, address, and remedy legal 
violations.  For instance, Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires lawyers representing issuer 
clients in any capacity to “report up” evidence of a material violation of securities law or breach of 
fiduciary duty or similar violation within the issuer corporation to the chief legal counsel or CEO.  15 
U.S.C. § 7245 (2006).  Moreover, it permits lawyers to “report out” such evidence in the event the 
corporate entity does not stop, prevent, or remedy the alleged wrongdoing.  Implementation of 
Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 8185, Exchange Act 
Release No. 47,276 (Jan. 29, 2003). 
303 See, e.g., David T. Moldenhauer, Circular 230 Opinion Standards, Legal Ethics and First 
Amendment Limitations on the Regulation of Professional Speech by Lawyers, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
843 (2006); Michael Schler, Effects of Anti-Tax-Shelter Rules on Nonshelter Tax Practice, 109 TAX 
NOTES 915, 918–19 (2005) (arguing that Circular 230, created “for the purpose of attacking tax 
shelters,” heavily regulates “normal day-to-day tax practice”).  It is worth noting that the government 
could easily focus the rules on abusive tax avoidance by requiring practitioners to “opt in” rather than 
“opt out” of the current system; that is, to affirm in writing when a legal opinion can be used by the 
taxpayer for penalty protection rather than affirming, as currently required, when an opinion cannot be 
used for penalty protection. 
304 31 C.F.R. § 10.35 (2007).  
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work product.305  If tax regulators wanted to enhance transparency in the 
current tax marketplace, they could ask taxpayers and their advisors to 
disclose what the government really wants: the opinion itself rather than 
information about certain transactions contained within the opinion.306  
What better way to enlist practitioners’ help in reducing noncompliance 
than requiring them to come clean on the kind of transactions they believe 
to be authorized, or they believe should be authorized, under the tax laws?  
Although overbroad in important but not insoluble respects, the 
disclosure rules contained in Circular 230 move us toward cooperative tax 
regulation.  With respect to legal opinions, Circular 230 requires that all 
covered opinions307 failing to reach a confidence level of “more likely than 
not” regarding one or more tax issues must include “appropriate 
disclosures.”308  Circular 230 further specifies that such disclosures must 
state “prominently” that the opinion does not in fact reach a conclusion at a 
confidence level of at least more likely than not, and that the opinion 
cannot be used by the taxpayer for purposes of avoiding tax underpayment 
penalties.  In other words, if a practitioner cannot conclude at a confidence 
level of at least more likely than not, then she must disclose that lack of 
confidence, both to the taxpayer and to the government.  This approach 
encourages an honest, interactive approach to tax regulation that turns 
taxpayers and tax practitioners into stakeholders, partners in the legislative 
and regulatory effort to buttress tax compliance. 
C.  Assessing Compliance Risks Under the New Rules 
The federal enforceable normative standard governing tax practice 
alters the cost-benefit analysis associated with noncompliance.  In 2004, 
Congress authorized monetary penalties against practitioners and firms for 
Circular 230 violations.309  The IRS may impose penalties either in 
addition to or in lieu of other sanctions that may be levied by the Service, 
                                                                                                                          
305 An exemplary no-penalty reliance legend reads:  
IRS Circular 230 Disclosure: To ensure compliance with requirements imposed 
by the IRS, we inform you that any U.S. tax advice contained in this communication 
(including any attachments) is not intended or written to be used, and cannot be 
used, for the purpose of (i) avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, or 
(ii) promoting, marketing or recommending to another party any matters addressed 
herein.  
Sheryl Stratton, Circular 230 E-Mails, T-Shirts Attain “Legendary” Status, 2005 TAX NOTES TODAY 
127-1.  For a discussion of the costs associated with the no-penalty reliance legend, see id. 
306 See Michael L. Schler, Ten More Truths About Tax Shelters: The Problem, Possible Solutions, 
and a Reply to Professor Weisbach, 55 TAX L. REV. 325, 353–54 (2002) (arguing that not requiring 
counsel to disclose its opinion about a full transaction “may seriously hurt the Service in its ability to 
discover and attack tax shelter transactions”).  Requiring disclosure of opinions would have to 
overcome the same kind of privilege and work-product concerns discussed supra note 253.  
307 For a definition of “covered opinion,” see supra note 256. 
308 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(3).  
309 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 822(a)(1), 118 Stat. 1418, 1586. 
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including censure, suspension, or disbarment.310  It will also post on the 
IRS website final agency disciplinary decisions pertaining to individual 
practitioners.311  The head of the IRS Office of Professional Responsibility 
(OPR) has said that the agency is not going after mere “foot faults,”312 but 
rather misconduct “out of the mainstream”313 by “really bad actors,”314 
those “who put a blemish on the industry.”315  Indeed, according to 
Michael Chesman, OPR Director, the IRS wants not only to “get the bad 
apples,”316 but also “to protect the practitioners and the public who are 
behaving ethically.”317  The sanctions will be used “only in extraordinary 
instances when traditional penalties may not appropriately punish 
violators,”318 and will be focused on “fitness to practice, not punish.”319 
Despite these assurances, practitioner groups remain wary of the 
government’s “powerful new weapon to deter prohibited conduct.”320  
They desire more certainty of what will and what will not be considered 
violations subject to monetary sanction, particularly because penalties 
could exceed fees collected on a transaction.321  Practitioners are also wary 
of the process surrounding disciplinary proceedings conducted by the OPR 
that precede the imposition of sanctions.  Though these proceedings are 
largely consistent with disciplinary procedures under ABA Model Rules 
                                                                                                                          
310 31 C.F.R. § 10.50. 
311 Tax Decisions & Rulings: OPR Posting Final Disciplinary Decisions for Circular 230 
Violations on IRS Website, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at K-1 (June 19, 2008); see also IRS 
Announcement 2008-52, 2008-22 I.R.B. 1040 (announcing disciplinary sanctions for violations of 
Circular 230); IRS Announcement 2008-50, 2008-21 I.R.B. 1024 (stating that the Office of 
Professional Responsibility will now publish a list of specific Circular 230 violations).  
312 Steve Burkholder, Ex-IRS Official Says Agency “Won War” on Shelters, Has “Fallen Short” 
on Tax Gap, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-1 (Oct. 11, 2007) (quoting Michael Chesman, Director, IRS 
Office of Professional Responsbility). 
313 Diane Freda, IRS Office of Professional Responsibility Looking for Conduct Outside 
Mainstream, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-6 (Nov. 2, 2007) (quoting Brinton Warren, special counsel 
in IRS Office of Chief Counsel). 
314 Diane Freda, Office of Professional Responsibility Seeks Bad Actors, Not Technical Errors, 
IRS Says, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-6 (Oct. 17, 2007) (quoting unnamed Internal Revenue 
officials). 
315 Burkholder, supra note 312, at G-1 (quoting Michael Chesman). 
316 Alison Bennett, OPR to Focus Sanctions on “Bad Apples,” Work Toward More Transparency 
in 2008, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-1 (Jan. 9, 2008) (quoting Michael Chesman). 
317 Id.  
318 Stephen Joyce, IRS Will Infrequently Impose Cash Penalties Due to Circular 230 Violations, 
Whitlock Says, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-1 (Jan. 8, 2007) (quoting Stephen Whitlock, Acting 
Director, IRS Office of Professional Responsibility). 
319 Kathleen David, Whitlock Says Practice, Not Punishment, Focus of Professional 
Responsibility Office, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-5 (Oct. 26, 2006) (paraphrasing Stephen 
Whitlock). 
320 New York State Bar Ass’n Tax Section, NYSBA Tax Section Comments on New Monetary 
Penalty Under Circular 230, TAXCORE (BNA) (Nov. 19, 2007).  
321 See, e.g., ABA Section of Taxation, ABA Tax Section Comments on Notice 2007-39, on 
Application of Monetary Penalties in Disciplinary Procedure Under Section 822 of Jobs Act, TAXCORE 
(BNA) (Oct. 9, 2007); American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, AICPA Comments on Notice 
2007-39 Regarding Monetary Penalties, Regulations Under Circular 230 on Tax Practice TAXCORE 
(BNA) (Aug. 29, 2007). 
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and state bar associations, they are unlike bar disciplinary proceedings in 
which the charging body and the body conducting the trial are distinct.  
The OPR performs both functions, a procedure that frightens practitioners 
who have come to expect lax enforcement of ethical guidelines by 
professional associations reluctant to discipline members.322 
The OPR—prosecutor, judge, and jury in these proceedings—must be 
mindful of practitioner anxieties concerning the system’s procedural 
fairness.  If the federal ethical guidelines governing tax practice are to 
achieve the normative force envisioned in this Article, tax regulators must 
not abuse their disciplinary powers.  Rather, they must impose the same 
kind of cooperative model on disciplinary proceedings as on procedures 
associated with guidance, rulemaking, and investigations.  The message 
has to be one of cooperation rather than intimidation, a message that the 
IRS is keen in sending.  Director Chesman has emphasized: “We want to 
be open, transparent, and a real partner in making sure there are high 
standards of ethics in the profession.”323 
In addition to providing the government a process for disciplining 
wayward practitioners while protecting the interests of ethical practitioners 
and taxpayers, the new federal rules governing tax practice unify diverse 
standards among different groups of tax professionals.324  Officially, the 
new regulations govern representation of taxpayers “before the Internal 
Revenue Service.”325  This group is distinctly interdisciplinary, and 
includes lawyers, certified public accountants, enrolled agents, and 
enrolled actuaries.326  The different professional organizations representing 
each group of practitioners maintain their own ethical standards.  
Furthermore, among attorneys, individual state bar associations interpret 
the standards promulgated by the national association differently.  By 
                                                                                                                          
322 For practitioner fears of OPR acting as prosecutor, judge, and jury, see Kathleen David, IRS 
Officials Discuss Pending Guidance on Practice Issues, Including Circular 230, DAILY TAX REP. 
(BNA), at G-6 (Oct. 26, 2006); Sheryl Stratton, ABA Tax Section Meeting: Monetary Penalty Guidance 
Due Out Soon, IRS Officials Say, 114 TAX NOTES 407 (2007).  For historically lax enforcement by 
professional organizations of ethical violations, see Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak 
of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1121 (1996) (finding that disciplinary boards “are notoriously 
underfunded and . . . unable or reluctant to mount the effort needed to do battle with wealthy class 
action lawyers and powerful members of the defense bar”).  Practitioner-scholar Michael Schler has 
observed that tax lawyers are not “unduly concerned about [the] threat” of being referred to a state 
disciplinary board, which is “designed to protect the client, not the Service.”  Schler, supra note 306, at 
366.  With respect to tax shelter advice running afoul of Circular 230 standards, Schler notes that the 
client “has received exactly what it paid for, namely an opinion that provides penalty protection.”  Id. 
323 Burkholder, supra note 312, at G-1 (quoting Michael Chesman); see also Bennett, supra note 
316, at G-1 (quoting Chesman as saying, “[w]e will be working to make this office more transparent, 
and answer questions of how we operate and what we do”). 
324 See James P. Holden, New Professional Standards in the Tax Marketplace: Opinions 314, 346 
and Circular 230, 4 VA. TAX REV. 209, 210 (1985) (calling Circular 230 “essential if the Secretary is 
to regulate practice effectively before the Internal Revenue Service because of the interdisciplinary 
nature of that practice”). 
325 31 C.F.R. § 10.0 (2007). 
326 Id. § 10.3. 
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offering a uniform set of practice and ethical guidelines that are 
disciplinary rather than merely aspirational, Circular 230 imposes 
coherence on the otherwise incoherent world of tax practice.  Moreover, 
although a minority of commentators interprets the reach of the federal 
regulations narrowly to capture only direct communications with the 
IRS,327 the consensus is that the rules govern all written tax advice, from 
planning to litigation.328  More importantly, tax officials are prepared to 
apply the regulations broadly.  Director Chesman has indicated that the 
OPR will be “very aggressive” in using monetary penalties against 
practitioners who engage in prohibited conduct under Circular 230,329 and 
that it will be “an activist office, a standard bearer for ethical behavior.”330 
Practitioners have responded affirmatively to their new ethical 
responsibilities.  Preliminary evidence indicates that shifting some of the 
costs of tax compliance to practitioners is working as planned.  According 
to KPMG’s Tax Governance Institute, 60% of surveyed companies 
reported that tax risk was a greater priority for corporate leadership in 2007 
than in 2006.331  In addition, Ernst & Young’s annual Tax Risk Services 
survey revealed that corporate tax departments are spending less time on 
tax planning and proprietary tax strategies, while devoting more time to 
complying with recent changes to the tax law and financial reporting 
requirements.332  Respondents to Ernst & Young’s worldwide survey 
reported that 9% of tax departments’ time was allocated to tax financial 
reporting matters in 2004 compared to 23% in 2006, a jump of more than 
150%, and that tax departments spent 40% less time on strategic tax 
planning in 2006 than in 2004.   
These trends in resource allocation away from planning and toward 
compliance will likely continue as investors demand more information 
about taxes from corporate executives.  “Fully 70 percent of companies 
surveyed in the Americas, are reporting increasing demands for more and 
                                                                                                                          
327 See, e.g., Arthur L. Bailey & Alexis A. MacIvor, New Circular 230 Regulations Impose Strict 
Standards for Tax Practitioners, 57 TAX EXECUTIVE 28, 36 (2005) (noting some commentators suggest 
Circular 230 does not apply to attorneys who fail to file a power of attorney to practice before the 
Service). 
328 See Beale, supra note 248, at 618 & n.122 (writing that notwithstanding technical arguments to 
the contrary, practitioners recognize the broad reach of Circular 230 “because of the potential relevance 
of any opinion to a tax controversy,” an event that gets you “before the Service”); James P. Holden, 
Dealing with the Aggressive Corporate Tax Shelter Problem, 82 TAX NOTES 707, 710–11 (1999) 
(criticizing the weak, “technical” argument that “some tax opinions would not be covered because 
Circular 230 does not explicitly include tax advice to taxpayers”). 
329 Martha Kessler, IRS Office of Professional Responsibility to Be Aggressive on Penalties, 
Director Says, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-2 (May 8, 2007) (quoting Michael Chesman). 
330 Kathleen David, “Zealous” Representation Not Reason for Disciplinary Action, Chesman 
Says, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-5 (May 16, 2007) (quoting Michael Chesman). 
331 See http://www.taxgovernanceinstitute.com.  
332 Stephen Joyce, Accounting Firms Increase Resources to Meet Reporting Requirements, Survey 
Says, 235 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-9 (Dec. 7, 2006).  
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better information on tax.”333  In addition, the government has made it clear 
to practitioners that notwithstanding strides in compliance, it expects them 
“to do more to protect the integrity of the system.”334  In January 2007, IRS 
Commissioner Mark Everson admonished the ABA’s Section of Taxation 
for its complicity in tax shelter activity during the 1990s and early 2000s, 
stating that he was “not satisfied” with the recent turnaround.335  “You can 
do better,” Everson urged, “[w]e need to keep working on this.”336 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In February 2008, the government won yet another court decision 
involving abusive tax avoidance.337  In a stinging rebuke to the taxpayer’s 
position, the Seventh Circuit found that the transaction in question—which 
generated a $3.6 million tax loss from an investment in which the taxpayer 
had $6,000 at risk—bestowed unwarranted tax benefits on both the 
taxpayer and the shelter organizer, “the sort of thing that the Internal 
Revenue Service frowns on.”338  The court detailed how the shelter 
organizer, disgraced tax lawyer Paul Daugerdas, issued opinion letters 
while at Jenkens & Gilchrist that “led to the firm’s demise,” and which 
forced it to pay out more than $75 million in penalties.339  Though perhaps 
lacking the style of the Seventh Circuit, other federal courts have reacted 
just as negatively to abusive tax avoidance.340  Government victories in 
2006 included four appellate court wins,341 which preceded three favorable 
district court decisions in 2007,342 two victories in the Court of Federal 
                                                                                                                          
333 Press Release, KPMG, Business Struggles with Worldwide Wave of Tax Regulation, Says 
KPMG International (May 17, 2007) (on file with author).   
334 Sheryl Stratton, Everson to Tax Bar: You Should Do More, 114 TAX NOTES 404, 404 (2007) 
(paraphrasing IRS Commissioner Everson’s comments to the tax bar at a plenary session of the 
American Bar Assocation Section of Taxation meeting).  
335 Id.  
336 Id.; see also Gilroy, supra note 301 (quoting Chief Counsel Korb as urging tax practitioners to 
“self-police” and to help the IRS encourage “self assessment” to protect the integrity of the tax system). 
337 Cemco Investors, LLC v. United States, 515 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2008).  
338 Id. at 751.  
339 Id. at 750.  
340 In one case, however, the Court of Federal Claims invalidated a tax shelter purchased by H.J. 
Heinz Co. in a style similar to that of the Seventh Circuit.  The court quipped:   
A Heinz promotion from the late 1950s and early 1960s touted its tomato 
ketchup by stating—“It’s Red Magic Time!”  But no amount of magic, red or 
otherwise, can hide the meat of the transactions in question, the connective 
tissues and gristle of which have been revealed by the multi-tined substance-
over-form doctrine.  Sans sa sauce, it becomes plain that plaintiffs’ 
transaction simply was not “the thing which the statute intended.  
H.J. Heinz Co. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 570, 593 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gregory v. 
Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935)). 
341 TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States, 459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2006); Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United 
States, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1261 (2007); Black & Decker Corp. v. 
United States, 436 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 2006); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 435 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 
2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1251 (2007).  
342 Cemco Investors, LLC v. United States, , No. 04-C-3211, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22246 (N.D. 
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Claims,343 and two U.S. Supreme Court denials of certiorari.344  In 2008, 
the government has continued to pile up wins with three circuit court 
victories345 and three favorable district court decisions.346 
Indeed, the government has been on a serious roll.  The legislative and 
regulatory attack on tax shelters has ignited the anti-shelter mood of the 
judiciary, which now more than ever scrutinizes tax practice standards and 
statutory penalties when analyzing challenged transactions.  It has even 
motivated the ABA to review and update its official position on written tax 
shelter opinions.347  Despite the indisputable anti-shelter momentum, it is 
premature to conclude, as some observers have, that “[t]he tax shelter war 
is over.  The government won.”348  The government’s fight against abusive 
tax avoidance has been episodic.  In the not so distant past, courts dealt the 
government a series of tax shelter losses that followed on the heels of 
seemingly momentous victories.349  Moreover, though we now point to 
certain cases as seminal anti-shelter wins, we should not forget that the 
government lost those cases in the lower courts,350 losses that underscore 
the contingent nature of the fight against abusive noncompliance.351 
                                                                                                                          
Ill. Mar. 27, 2007), aff’d, 515 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2008); Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, LLC v. United 
States, 472 F. Supp. 2d 885 (E.D. Tex. 2007); BB&T Corp. v. United States, No. 1:04-CV-00941, 2007 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 321 (M.D.N.C. 2007), aff’d, 523 F.3d 461 (4th Cir. 2008).  
343 Jade Trading, LLC v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 11 (2007); H.J. Heinz Co. v. United States, 76 
Fed. Cl. 570. 
344 Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 1261 (2007); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 
127 S. Ct. 1251 (2007).   
345 Cemco Investors, LLC v. United States, 515 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2008); Kornman & Assocs. 
Inc. v. United States, 527 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 2008); BB&T Corp. v. United States, 523 F.3d 461 (4th 
Cir. 2008).   
346 AWG Leasing Trust v. United States, No. 1:07-CV-857, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42761 (N.D. 
Ohio May 28, 2008); Fifth Third Bancorp v. United States, No. 1:05-CV-350 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 18, 
2008); Enbridge Energy Co. v. United States, 533 F. Supp. 2d 716 (S.D. Tex. 2008).  
347 See ABA Formal Op. 346, 25 ABA SECTION OF TAXATION NEWSQUARTERLY 3, 3 (2006) 
(explaining that in response to the 2004 amendments to Circular 230, the ABA Standing Committee on 
Ethics and Professional Responsibility undertook a thorough review of ABA Formal Opinion 346 
which provides professional standards for written tax shelter opinions relied upon by third-party non-
clients).  
348 Pamela F. Olson, Now that You’ve Caught the Bus, What Are You Going to Do with It?: 
Observations from the Frontlines, the Sidelines, and Between the Lines, So to Speak, 60 TAX LAW. 
567, 567 (2007). 
349 See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001) (reversing 
the Tax Court’s decision to uphold deficiencies and negligence penalty); United Parcel Serv. of Am., 
Inc. v. Commissioner, 254 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001) (reversing the Tax Court’s determination that the 
restructuring of customer loss claims amounted to a sham); IES Indus., Inc. v. United States, 253 F. 3d 
350 (8th Cir. 2001) (reversing the district court and finding as valid a listed transaction generating a 
foreign tax credit and capital loss).  
350 TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D. Conn. 2004), rev’d, 459 F.3d 220 (2d 
Cir. 2006); Coltec Indus. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 716 (2004), vacated, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 
2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1261 (2007); Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 2d 
621 (D. Md. 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 436 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 2006); Dow Chem. Co. v. United 
States, 250 F. Supp. 2d 748 (E.D. Mich. 2003), rev’d, 435 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. 
Ct. 1251 (2007).  
351 Professor Weisbach explains the contingency:  
Recent taxpayer wins show that the series of government wins was a mere 
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Rather than declare victory over tax avoidance, we would do well to 
continue strengthening the existing tax compliance regime.  To this end, 
this Article has offered a combination of reforms to move the current 
regime further from a failed command-and-control approach to one that 
emphasizes cooperation, information sharing, and interest convergence.  
Currently, U.S. tax regulation relies too heavily on sticks and not enough 
on carrots.  While recognizing that taxpayers will comply with the law in 
the presence of effective deterrence and enforcement, this Article 
optimizes the use of penalties as a compliance instrument by, among other 
things, rewarding compliant taxpayers, engaging taxpayers and their 
advisors in a participatory process, and employing cognitive devices that 
portray payment of taxes as a bonus rather than nonpayment of taxes as a 
penalty.  
Even with optimal penalties, tax officials cannot currently enforce the 
law effectively due to severe resource and information asymmetries.  To 
overcome these crippling shortcomings, the government must improve 
funding, recruiting, training, and retention.  It must also partner with 
taxpayers and tax practitioners to strengthen detection, enforcement, and 
prosecution of abusive tax avoidance.  If successfully implemented, 
cooperative tax regulation can accomplish a cultural shift not only in 
taxpaying, but also in tax advising and tax administration.  It can produce a 
regulatory environment of collaboration rather than adversity, ex ante 
resolution rather than ex post controversy, and certainty rather than 
secrecy.  Ultimately, cooperative tax regulation can forge a shared 
understanding among taxpayers, tax practitioners, and the government of 
what it means to comply with the law.   
                                                                                                                          
coincidence, much like baseball teams on a streak that is merely a property of 
statistics rather than a change in ball playing skills.  Although not literally 
independent like a coin flip, the analogy is close enough: If we flip enough coins, 
we are likely eventually to get 10 heads in a row.  It may seem like the heads are 
on a streak, but the odds on each flip have not changed.  The apparent advantage 
for heads and for the government is a result of selective vision. 
David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215, 228–29 (2002) 
(footnote omitted). 
